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For over 40 years, lawmakers and academics have been 
debating whether the United States should adopt a merit-
or skills-based approach to labor immigration and a 
points-based program for selecting foreign workers. 
Despite having bipartisan support, efforts to adopt such a 
program thus far have been unsuccessful. 
This idea is now back at the center of public debate, 
having been given new life by President Trump. He has 
called for “merit-based” immigration reforms that would 
make the United States more effective at attracting the 
world’s “best and brightest” and make it more 
competitive in the global marketplace for highly skilled 
foreign workers. The President’s public embrace of this
goal has not been accompanied, however, by any detailed 
policy proposal or administration-backed bill introduced 
in Congress. 
This report capitalizes on this atmosphere of renewed 
interest by harnessing the current administration’s
enthusiasm, providing evidence-based policy guidance, 
and mapping out a path forward that avoids the policy 
gridlock and political pitfalls that have beset past efforts 
to implement a points-based immigration program in the 
United States. 
This path forward is presented in the form of a legislative 
program. The authors recommend that the U.S. create a 
small pilot program that would allocate 50,000 green 
cards each year to candidates selected through a novel 
points-based selection program. Alongside this small 
pilot, the authors recommend creating a number of 
administrative supports meant to ensure that this program 
is effective, flexible, and transparent. Included are 
guidelines and financial support for U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) or another executive 
agency to gather linked long-term data on the 
employment outcomes of admitted foreign workers; 
provisions requiring periodic review of the program by 
relevant congressional committees; and the establishment 
of a standing advisory board consisting of immigration 
experts and stakeholders. 
In designing these proposals, the authors sought to 
incorporate lessons from both the successes enjoyed by 
those countries that have already implemented points 
programs and the failures endured by those involved in 
past efforts toward comprehensive immigration reform 
here in the United States. Lessons from the former led the 
authors to embrace a two-stage selection process and 
criteria designed to balance both the short- and long-term 
needs of the U.S. economy. Lessons from the latter led 
the authors to adopt a more targeted and incremental 
approach to immigration reform, resulting in a policy 
proposal that is modest in its size, scope, strategy, and 
structure. 
The points-tested visa program laid out in this proposal 
would be temporary by design, initially authorized for just 
ten years, and would increase the number of green cards 
issued each year by only 4%. This program is designed to 
supplement, not displace, existing employment-related 
and family-based immigration categories. As such, this 
proposal does not call for any changes to existing 
immigration categories. Finally, the proposal embraces a 
piecemeal and incremental approach to legislative 
strategy, recommending that the pilot program be 
introduced in Congress as a standalone bill rather than as 
part of a comprehensive immigration reform package. 
For all these reasons, the authors believe that the policy 
recommendations presented in this report are legislatively 
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“[I]nstead of admitting people through random 
chance, we will establish simple, universal criteria for 
admission to the United States. No matter where in 
the world you’re born, no matter who your relatives 
are, if you want to become an American citizen, it 
will be clear exactly what standard we ask you to 
achieve. … Like Canada and so many other modern 
countries, we create an easy-to-navigate points-based 
selection system.” President Donald Trump, May 
16, 2019. 1 
U.S. academics, policy experts, and lawmakers have been 
proposing “merit-based,” “skills-based,” or “points-
based” employment-based immigration systems since the 
late 1970s.2 Since then, several bills have been introduced 
in Congress proposing such a system, 3 three of which 
have come within striking distance of passing.4 So far, 
however, advocates and supporters have failed to enact 
such an immigration selection system in the United 
States. 
The idea of a points-based immigration selection system 
is once again at the center of public debate, largely 
because of statements by President Trump and members 
of his administration. Since before he took office, 
President Trump has made his support for a “merit-based”
immigration system a core element of his immigration 
platform.5 Indeed, this policy goal has been featured in 
many of the President’s most high-profile formal remarks 
on immigration, from his first address to Congress in 
20176 to a 2019 Rose Garden speech on the 
administration’s immigration priorities.7 In the latter set 
of remarks, President Trump called for the adoption of an 
employment-based immigration system in which 
“immigrants are selected based on skill or based on merit”
and in which applicants would receive “points for being a
younger worker,… for having a valuable skill, an offer of
employment, an advanced education, or a plan to create 
jobs.”8 
Even as the President and his administration have 
consistently expressed support for merit-based (or points-
or skills-based) immigration, however, this advocacy has 
yet to advance beyond high-level talking points. The 
White House has not stated how such a system would be 
implemented,9 and no administration-backed bill has been 
introduced in Congress. 
The atmosphere of renewed interest combined with a lack 
of details has opened a space for a new round of debate 
over whether and how the United States might adopt an 
immigration points program. The contemporary 
atmosphere of political gridlock and the lack of success so 
far might encourage participants to find new approaches 
to this idea. 
This report aims to do just that, drawing on past lessons 
and existing innovations while adding something new. 
Specifically, our proposal calls for: 
• The enactment, as a 10-year pilot program, of a new 
green card stream in which applicants are evaluated 
according to a points rubric. 
• Allocating to this pilot program 50,000 permanent 
visas per year, without changing other current 
immigration categories. 
• A single application stream, managed through an 
“expression of interest” application system like Canada
and Australia. 
• A points rubric weighted toward longer-term human 
capital factors such as educational attainment, age, 
experience, teamwork, and linguistic abilities. We 
already have the existing labor certification system for 
short-term labor needs. We would not change that. 
Rather, our proposed program would focus instead on 
long-term human capital needs in the United States. 
• An oversight apparatus capable of gathering detailed 
immigration data, keeping track of immigration 
outcomes through large-scale longitudinal studies. 
• A regular policy review process under which current 
admission policies and post-entry integration and 
support policies would be examined using (a) current 
labor market data and future labor market projections 
and (b) economic and societal integration outcome data 










• A standing advisory board consisting of experts, 
policymakers, and stakeholders, including policy 
experts in economics, public policy, and immigration; 
civil servants with experience in administering the 
United States’ and/or other countries’ immigration
systems; and representatives from professional 
associations, labor unions, and industry trade 
associations. 
In many ways, our proposal isn’t all that novel. Our points
rubric (the list of characteristics on which applicants are 
evaluated and the relative point weights allocated to each) 
resembles the points systems contained in past 
immigration bills introduced in Congress. And the 
application process and administration of our proposed 
system is modeled on the efficient, flexible, and all-digital 
systems now employed in Australia, Canada, and other 
countries. 
The novelty of our proposal lies in its intentional 
modesty—in size, scope, strategy, and structure: 
• Size: Our proposed points-tested pilot program would 
apply to only 50,000 green cards each year, about 4% 
of overall yearly immigration to the United States. 
• Scope: Our proposal does not call for making any 
changes to existing immigration categories. Our 
proposed pilot program is designed to supplement, not 
displace, existing immigrant visa categories. 
• Strategy: Our proposal recommends that Congress 
enact this pilot program as a standalone bill, rather than 
as part of a comprehensive immigration reform 
package. 
• Structure: Our proposal recommends creating this new 
green card stream as a 10-year pilot program. Building 
in this extendable expiration date reduces political 
commitment costs for legislators, while also giving 
enough time to generate reliable data to measure the 
program’s impact. 
This four-squared modesty sets our proposal apart from 
past efforts to establish a points system. Moreover, we 
believe this modesty gives our proposal a chance to 
succeed where others have failed. 
Our research suggests that the failure of past efforts to 
implement an immigration points program in the United 
States was due more to partisan overreach and legislative 
ambition than to the specific provisions of the points 
system itself. Presented as part of a sweeping 
restructuring of U.S. employment-based immigration and 
contained within omnibus immigration bills that would 
have imposed cuts on other immigration streams, past 
efforts were either too costly to attract the support of 
undecided lawmakers or too contentious to obtain the 
support of vital groups. 
Our proposal seeks to avoid these problems of scale. Its 
incremental approach, narrow subject matter, and small 
policy footprint combine to make our proposal a low-cost, 
low-risk proposition for legislators. By lowering these 
barriers to entry for undecided lawmakers and providing a 
realistic path to adoption for lawmakers on both sides of 
the aisle who have already expressed support for 
employment-based immigration reform, our proposal 
represents a viable way to achieve the goal of 
implementing an immigration points program in the 
United States. 
This goal—finding ways to pass legislation that aims to 
reform and improve the United States’ employment-based 
immigration system despite the current atmosphere of 
gridlock and partisan polarization—is vitally important. 
The United States’ current approach to skilled 
immigration is broken. Rigid yearly caps and quotas on 
permanent residents and certain classes of temporary 
foreign workers severely limit the supply of visas and 
talent, while demand continues to expand and the list of 
qualified applicants grows. This dynamic, along with 
increasingly stringent administrative requirements and 
long processing times, has led to the formation of 
backlogs lasting years (and even decades) for even the 
most qualified applicants. Certain high-skilled Indian 
nationals seeking an employment-related green card, for 
example, currently must wait over a decade, as the State 
Department is only now setting interview dates for such 
individuals whose applications were filed in May 2009.10 
These backlogs and delays impose unnecessary financial, 
logistical, and psychological costs on prospective foreign 
workers seeking to come to or remain in the United 
States. These added costs have started to lead potential 
would-be immigrants to go elsewhere, 11 creating a “brain 
drain” effect. 
These backlogs and delays also impose costs on U.S. 
companies and workers. Access to skilled labor is a 
critical determinant of success for start-up firms and small 
and large businesses,12 many of which struggle to find 





high-skilled immigration to the United States are often 
cast as protections for U.S. workers, those restrictions 
have not resulted in U.S. firms hiring more native 
workers, but instead have led U.S. companies to move 
certain jobs to more immigration-friendly countries like 
13Canada and Australia. 
Taken together, these adverse effects pose a serious 
problem to our nation’s fiscal, economic, and geopolitical 
health and future. In encouraging talented individuals to 
take their skills, creativity, productivity, and tax dollars to 
other countries, the United States forgoes significant 
economic, intellectual, and fiscal gains. In imposing 
artificial challenges for U.S. businesses, the United States 
is falling behind in the global race for talent. And, insofar 
as the United States’ global standing depends in large part
on its role as a home for the most talented researchers, 
inventors, innovators, and entrepreneurs, this is not only a 
matter of geopolitical pride but also of national security.14 
Stated simply, it is in the United States’ best interests to 
adopt policies that foster high-skilled immigration. 
As a general matter, immigrants generate far more 
economic and fiscal benefits than costs. Indeed, according 
to a 2017 study conducted by the National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, the average recent 
immigrant will, over a lifetime, end up generating a 
positive net fiscal impact of more than $279,000 (in 2012 
dollars, an amount worth more than $312,000 today). 
Stated another way, even if we subtract the total cost of 
all government benefits this individual will likely receive 
over a lifetime from the total amount of taxes this 
individual will pay (including all taxes paid to local, state, 
and federal governments) during their lifetime, an average 
recent immigrant will end up generating around $300,000 
in additional tax dollars paid.15 
In the same study, the National Academies found that 
highly skilled immigrants—defined as those with 
education beyond a bachelor’s degree—will likely each 
generate between $523,000 and $915,000 in positive 
fiscal value over their lifetimes.16 (These values were also 
calculated in 2012 dollars. If adjusted to 2020 dollars, the 
net lifetime fiscal benefits of these skilled immigrants 
would be between $589,000 and $1.03 million each.) 
Additionally, highly skilled immigration has been found 
to have profound and positive “scaling effects” on jobs
and wages for U.S. workers. According to a study by the 
National Foundation for American Policy, every H-1B 
worker hired by a U.S. firm creates 5 to 7.5 new domestic 
jobs in that firm’s industry.17 And according to a 2014 
study, every 1% increase in foreign STEM (science, 
technology, engineering, and math) workers leads to a 7 
to 8% increase in U.S. workers’ wages.18 
The benefits of skilled immigration are not limited to tech 
firms and the large urban areas in which they tend to be 
concentrated. Fostering skilled immigration can also 
benefit communities in rural America.19 Such 
communities face a number of challenges, including a 
dire and growing shortage of physicians and other 
healthcare workers. According to one recent report, rural 
counties have on average fewer than half as many active 
physicians per capita as urban counties, and 135 of these 
counties don’t have a single active physician.20 This 
shortage is already preventing many U.S. residents from 
having reliable access to vital medical care, and it is likely 
to get worse as rural doctors continue to retire faster than 
they are replaced.21 Relaxing current restrictions on 
skilled immigration could help to reverse these troubling 
trends, because foreign-born doctors are more likely than 
their U.S.-born counterparts to practice as primary care 
providers22 and to be willing to live and work in poor or 
23rural communities. 
This report presents a set of policy and program 
recommendations that we believe would be broadly 
popular, legislatively achievable, and programmatically 
successful. In the following pages, we provide an 
introduction to points-based economic immigration 
systems, the ways they are currently being employed in 
Canada and Australia, best practices regarding their use 
and implementation, and our proposal for a pilot program 
in the United States. 
president-trump-modernizing-immigration-system-stronger-1 Donald Trump, “Remarks by President Trump on Modernizing 
america/.Our Immigration System for a Stronger America” (Speech, 
White House, Washington, D.C., May 16, 2019), 2 For example, the members of the Hesburgh Select Commission 
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Context, Concepts, and Definitions 
Debates about immigration policy often are confusing and 
politically charged. This is particularly true of discussions 
about “merit-” or “skills-based” labor migration policies 
and “points-based” selection systems. Obstacles like 
specialized but often inconsistent terminology, fine 
technical distinctions, and politicized connotations and 
agendas all combine to make it difficult for well-meaning 
people across the political spectrum to discuss these 
public policy tools in an effective way. 
This chapter is designed to assist readers not already 
familiar with these aspects of immigration policy. It 
provides a brief introduction to the foundations of 
immigration policy, defines and distinguishes relevant 
terminology, and gives a brief overview of the history and 
spread of merit-based immigration regimes and points-
based selection systems. 
§ 1 POLICY CONTEXT 
The “Three Streams” of Immigration
Every country that accepts immigrants must decide what 
kinds of immigrants it wants. Countries have tended to 
focus on specific factors, such as: Is this potential 
immigrant related or married to a citizen or resident of our 
country? Would admitting a foreign worker adversely 
affect native workers? Do we have a duty to admit people 
fleeing persecution? These three questions correspond to 
the three general types—or “streams”—of immigration 
recognized by most countries today: family, economic, 
and humanitarian. 
These streams are distinguished according to the 
differences in the criteria on which potential immigrants 
are selected.1 Generally speaking, in the family stream, 
potential immigrants are selected on the basis of having a 
family member already residing in or originating from the 
destination country. In the economic stream, potential 
immigrants are selected on the basis of their potential to 
contribute to the economic well-being of the destination 
country or because no native workers are available for a 
particular job. In the humanitarian stream, potential 
immigrants are selected on the basis of a credible threat to 
their life, liberty, or health that has led them to leave their 
prior country of residence. Each of these streams satisfies 
a different government interest or policy goal. Family-
stream immigration promotes the state’s interest in
providing its nationals and permanent residents with the 
chance to reunite with their family members and loved 
ones, thus promoting societal stability. 
Humanitarian-stream immigration serves the state’s
interest in acting as a humane member of the international 
community and honoring international obligations and 
agreements by offering refuge to those fleeing persecution 
and violence. Economic-stream immigration serves the 
state’s interests in promoting the health of its domestic
economy and job market by admitting migrants that have 
the capacity to generate economic growth or fill gaps in 
the labor market not addressed by native workers. 
Each of these state interests is important but distinct. So, 
in addition to deciding what kinds of immigrants to 
accept, countries must determine how many of each kind 
of immigrant they want to accept. Or, put another way, 
policymakers must decide what balance to strike among 
these three immigration-related government interests, as 
well as between these interests and the panoply of other 
interests a state has. 
Key Questions in Economic-Stream Immigration 
Policy 
In designing and governing economic-stream 
immigration, policymakers face questions like: How 
should foreign workers be selected, and who should select 
them? What goals should economic-stream migration 
policy pursue? And how should the state balance 
competing goals, such as addressing near-term labor 
market shortages versus ensuring the longer-term health 
of the economy? What kinds of protections should be 
built into our immigration system to make sure that 
citizen or permanent resident workers are not being 
unfairly disadvantaged, immigrant workers are not being 
exploited, and economic migration programs are in fact 







Two Approaches to Selecting Economic-Stream 
Immigrants: Demand- vs. Supply-Driven Models 
In the academic and policy literature, countries’ economic
immigration systems are often categorized according to 
how they address the first of these underlying questions: 
How should foreign workers be selected, and who should 
select them? Broadly speaking, states use one of two 
approaches in selecting foreign workers: a “demand-
driven” approach or a “supply-driven” approach.2 
Under a demand-driven approach, employers in a country 
play the leading role in recruiting and selecting foreign 
workers. (This is why these systems are also commonly 
referred to as “employer-led” or “job-offer” systems.)
Countries employing this approach generally make 
economic immigration contingent on having a job offer 
from an employer within the destination country, a 
requirement that effectively gives employers the ability to 
set criteria for admission and to apply those criteria by 
selecting which foreign workers’ applications can move
forward. Employers set the selection criteria by seeking 
candidates who have the skills or qualifications to satisfy 
their firm’s actual labor needs, enact their selections by 
making job offers to the candidates of their choice, and 
may initiate the immigration process by asking 
immigration authorities to grant the foreign worker an 
employment visa. Because selection decisions in a 
demand-driven system are made by employers according 
to their actual labor needs in real time, these systems tend 
to result in selection outcomes that favor short-term 
economic needs over longer-term goals. For the same 
reason, they also tend to result in selection outcomes that 
reflect the interests of the companies seeking to employ 
foreign labor and not necessarily the broader interests of 
the receiving state. States whose immigration policies and 
programs have generally adopted a demand-driven 
approach to labor immigration include Germany, Sweden, 
Spain, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States.3 
Under a supply-driven approach, government officials 
and immigration agencies take the lead in recruiting and 
selecting foreign workers. (This is why these systems are 
also commonly referred to as “government-led” systems.)
In these systems, government immigration agencies 
accept applications directly from prospective foreign 
workers. These individuals’ applications for entry are then 
assessed by immigration officers, not according to 
prevailing labor market conditions but according to 
criteria established by policymakers in advance. These 
criteria, set by either statute or administrative regulation, 
may include educational qualifications, work experience, 
age, language skills, the existence of a job offer or 
arranged employment,4 and previous wages. Because 
selection decisions in supply-driven systems are made 
according to criteria set by government officials 
according to the needs of the economy or polity as a 
whole, these systems tend to result in selection outcomes 
that favor medium- and longer-term goals, such as 
addressing foreseeable labor market imbalances or 
accumulating human capital. Countries commonly 
associated with this approach to selecting foreign workers 
include Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.5 
This clean distinction between demand-driven and 
supply-driven approaches is an artificially simplified 
comparison of ideal types. It provides a useful lens 
through which to compare the structure and effects of 
labor immigration programs across states, but in reality all 
states fall somewhere along a continuum between these 
two extremes. Most countries that employ a supply-driven 
(government-led) approach to labor immigration have 
incorporated, to one degree or another, policy features 
that make their immigration programs more responsive to 
employer interests or labor market demand, whether by 
granting expedited processing or bonus points to visa 
applicants with a verified job offer or by limiting 
admission to candidates whose profession is included on a 
“shortage occupation list.”6 Similarly, no country has an 
immigration system that is entirely employer-led. In these 
countries, employers seeking to hire foreign workers must 
do so according to regulatory parameters set by 
government officials or national legislation. And in even 
the most “demand-driven” systems, proof of an 
employment offer is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for admission, as visa applications are often 
subjected to various secondary requirements. Common 
examples of these include minimum salary requirements 
(meant to protect foreign workers and native workers 
alike against wage suppression); labor market tests 
assessing whether there are similarly qualified native 
workers that could fill the position (meant to incentivize 
the hiring of native workers); and minimum qualification 
requirements (meant to ensure that foreign workers are 
















§ 2 CORE CONCEPTS “Merit-Based” or “Skills-Based” Immigration
Although the terms “merit-based immigration” and 
“points-based selection” have been used frequently in 
debates over immigration policy for decades, these terms 
and the relationships between them are commonly 
misunderstood by political figures and the general public 
alike. 
Some of this confusion is the result of disagreements 
about terminology among academics and policy experts. 
In some cases, different authors continue to use a variety 
of terms to refer to more or less the same concept—as in 
the case of “merit-based,” “skills-based,” “talent-based,”
and “knowledge-based” immigration. In others, different
authors use the same term to refer to different concepts, 
such as the phrase, “two-step immigration systems,” a
description used by some scholars to refer to “Expression 
of Interest” application management systems7 (discussed 
below) and by others to refer to provisional-to-permanent 
visa pathways.8 That said, these disagreements about 
technical terminology are not unusual in a subject of 
much debate that crosses so many national, political, 
ideological, and disciplinary lines. And while such 
apparent discrepancies may frustrate a casual reader, they 
are not enough to prevent experts from understanding 
each other. 
A greater share of the confusion is the result of these 
terms having become political buzzwords, taking on a 
second layer of meaning. Previously only used in their 
technical sense by immigration policy experts, terms like 
“merit-based immigration” and “points system” have
started to be used by political figures and commentators 
as rhetorical shorthand and political shibboleths used to 
signal loyalty to a larger set of ideological commitments 
and policy preferences.9 This rhetorical and political 
adoption of these terms results, for example, in phrases 
like “merit-based immigration reform” containing two 
layers of meaning: one referring to a change in how 
economic immigration policy and programs are run, and 
the other referring to a shift in the balance between the 
family and economic immigration streams. 
The following section aims to undo some of the effects of 
this politicized rhetoric by providing clear technical 
definitions of these and other key terms. 
As technical policy terms, “merit-based immigration” and 
“skills-based immigration” are both used to describe
economic-stream immigration programs in which: (a) 
candidates’ applications for entry are evaluated according 
to their skills, talents, training, and/or other measures of 
“human capital” and “economic potential”;10 and (b) the 
decision to select successful applicants is made by 
someone other than a potential employer. These kinds of 
programs are, therefore, one way of implementing a 
supply-driven (government-led) approach to selecting 
economic immigrants. 
Although the terms “merit-based” and “skills-based” have
slightly different connotations, these two terms—and the 
less common “talent-based”11 and “knowledge-based”12—
are used more or less interchangeably in both popular and 
academic discussions of immigration policy. That said, 
although it is common for policy experts to treat “points-
based immigration” as synonymous with “merit-based 
immigration,”13 strictly speaking this is incorrect. While 
many “merit-based” immigration programs employ 
“points-based” selection systems, this association is not
universal. Some countries, such as the United Kingdom, 
Japan, and South Korea, have employed points tests as 
secondary requirements in otherwise employer-driven 
immigration programs. And others, such as Canada 
between 1962 and 1967, have implemented merit-based 
economic visa programs that did not use a points test to 
select candidates. 
“Points-Based” or “Points-Tested” Immigration
and Selection Systems 
Points-based selection systems (also commonly referred 
to as points-based immigration systems, points-tested 
systems, or simply points systems) are a policy tool 
through which lawmakers can implement an immigration 
policy or program. Traditionally, points-based systems 
have been used to assess prospective foreign workers’
applications to enter a host country on a work visa. In this 
context, eligibility decisions are made in whole or in part 
according to whether a given candidate is able to score 
above a threshold number of points in a scoring system 
that measures factors such as education level, connection 











Points-based selection systems are largely policy neutral. 
They are simply a policy tool by which policymakers can 
ensure that applications for a given visa program are 
assessed consistently, and that each application is 
assessed according to multiple variously weighted 
criteria.14 
Although points-based selection programs have mostly 
been used in economic immigration systems, they could 
just as easily be used as a means to quantify the 
application of other kinds of selection criteria. For 
example, a points-based selection mechanism could be 
employed in a family-stream migration system.15 A 
policymaker might include “degree of relation to 
sponsoring relative” as a selection criteria, and this could 
be quantified by assigning potential point values to the 
various familial relationships that might exist between the 
applicant and a given family member residing in the 
target state (e.g., parent, child, sibling, cousin). 
While their specifics may vary, every points system 
shares one characteristic: their selection criteria and the 
relative weight of each factor are quantified, with each 
criterion being assigned a maximum possible point value. 
These criteria and point values are set in advance and 
made available to immigration officers, the public, and 
aspiring immigrants. Along with the criteria and 
maximum point values, states generally also include 
guidelines on how the points within each criterion will be 
assigned to any given applicant. For binary criteria—e.g., 
the existence of a job offer—these guidelines are simple, 
directing immigration officers to grant the full number of 
points allocated to that criterion to any applicant 
satisfying its conditions and no points to applicants who 
do not. Most criteria, however, are non-binary, and thus 
the guidelines for scoring these criteria lay out the varying 
levels of “partial credit” that can be allocated under these
categories. In a scoring system in which the criterion of 
education has 10 possible points, the scoring guidelines 
might direct immigration officials to grant 10 points to 
candidates who hold a doctoral degree, 8 points to those 
holding a master’s degree, and 5 points to those with any 
undergraduate postsecondary degree. These scoring 
system details—the criteria, point values, and scoring 
guidelines—may be communicated in plain prose or 
formatted as a points table (also referred to as a “points
grid”16 or “rubric”17), a two-dimensional table with 
columns corresponding to the names of criteria, possible 
point values, and scoring guidance. 
“Skilled” or “High-Skilled” Immigration
There is no single, agreed-upon definition of skilled or 
highly-skilled persons or occupations employed across 
countries and among scholars. There are a variety of 
approaches to defining this term, all of which employ one 
or more of the following three characteristics: 
education/training, occupation, and salary. 
Academics tend to define high-skilled migration 
sparingly, using only one or two of these factors. This 
trend toward parsimony is perhaps the result of an effort 
to make these definitions more suitable to broad-scale 
quantitative analyses. Some researchers define skill solely 
according to the level of education a given migrant has 
acquired,18 while others define “skill” according to the
occupation a given migrant has or will work in.19 Other 
studies have employed slightly more complicated 
approaches, defining skill according to the occupation and 
the salary a given migrant has earned. However, this 
approach has not been as widely adopted.20 
Most receiving states tend to adopt approaches that 
examine more than one of these approaches. For example, 
Australia and Canada classify certain immigrants (and 
immigration streams) as “skilled” on the basis of at least
three of the following four characteristics: the skill level 
required by the immigrant’s occupation, the amount and 
type of work experience they have already accrued, their 
level of education, and their language skills. 
The current U.S. immigration system does not employ 
this kind of skilled/unskilled distinction. The closest 
analog employed in the United States is the idea of a 
“specialty occupation” employed in the current H-1B 
temporary visa program, defined as an occupation 
requiring at least a four-year degree. In the interest of 
continuity and ease of implementation, our proposed 
program would adopt this definition. 
“Human Capital”
The term “human capital” is something of a shibboleth
among immigration policymakers and scholars, a term of 
art that acts as a shorthand for many of the gains that 
skilled immigration promises.21 Despite its centrality to 
arguments both for and against skilled immigration, 
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however, lawmakers and experts making these arguments 
have yet to agree on a definition of the term.22 
The concept of human capital emerged from the field of 
economics in the mid-twentieth century in the work of 
scholars like Gary S. Becker and Theodor W. Schultz. 
These early works examined the impact on future incomes 
that can be expected from schooling and other forms of 
training.23 Given this goal, these economists defined the 
concept of “human capital” simply as the set of skills that
individuals may acquire as a result of investments of time 
and resources in education or training.24 
In the intervening decades, this concept spread beyond 
economics. As it spread, arguments arose over the precise 
boundaries of this term. What kinds of skills should be 
understood as human capital, and which should not? To 
what degree are an individual’s future earnings dictated 
by learned skills as opposed to innate abilities? What 
kinds of education or training should count? And how can 
we measure this form of capital, which is neither 
transferrable nor tangible? 
In the last two decades, as economists and policymakers 
have sought better explanations of differences in 
productivity and development across countries, there has 
been a renewed interest in developing useful and 
quantifiable measures of human capital.25 
The academic literature on skilled immigration uses the 
term “human capital” to refer to the skills and knowledge
possessed by individual migrants or to immigration 
policies or programs that select for these qualities. In this 
latter context, it is used to describe a possible approach to 
valuing or admitting skilled migrants, with the “human 
capital model of immigration” generally set at one end of
a continuum and the “labor shortages model of
immigration” set at the other. 
Under the labor shortages model, the value of skilled 
immigration is determined by the needs of the labor 
market. Skilled immigration is thus cast as a tool to be 
used only to address specific and immediate labor 
shortages in vital economic sectors. 
By contrast, under a human capital model, the value of 
high-skilled migration is determined not in reference to 
the labor market but rather in reference to the needs of the 
larger economy, often specifically focusing on economic 
growth. Analyses emphasizing the human capital model 
generally hold that persistent economic growth is not 
possible without the accumulation of human capital.26 
This is because it is only through the efforts, abilities, and 
ideas of the individuals that make up a country’s “stock”
of human capital that new ideas and technological 
advancements can be generated.27 As such, immigration 
policies that select for human capital are thought to be 
advantageous because those immigrants with higher 
levels of education and experience can contribute needed 
skills and expertise and are better able to adjust to both 
cyclical and structural changes in the labor market than 
those with lower levels of education.28 
§ 3 HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
With this theoretical context laid out and relevant terms 
defined, we now turn to how policymakers have actually 
implemented points systems over the past half century. 
Origin and Proliferation 
In 1967, Canada implemented the world’s first points-
based selection system as part of an effort to attract larger 
numbers of skilled foreign workers to meet the growing 
needs of its domestic labor market. This policy tool has 
since spread to more than a dozen other countries. 
The first states to follow Canada’s lead were Australia
and New Zealand, with the former adopting a points 
system in 1972 and the latter in 1991. This proliferation 
accelerated in the early 2000s as countries across Asia 
and Europe reformed and updated their labor immigration 
systems. In Europe, the United Kingdom and the Czech 
Republic were the first to implement points systems in 
2002 and 2003, respectively, 29 followed by Denmark in 
2007,30 the Netherlands in 2008,31 and Austria in 2011.32 
In Asia, Singapore was the first to adopt a points system 
in 2004,33 followed by China34 and Hong Kong35 in 2006, 
Malaysia in 2010,36 Japan in 2012,37 and South Korea in 
2017.38 
In addition to these fully implemented points systems, a 
number of countries have moved toward adopting a points 
system. Mexico and Turkey, in 201239 and 2016,40 
respectively, both passed legislation laying the 
groundwork for immigration points systems that have not 
yet been fully implemented, and Germany ran a points-
based pilot program from 2016 to 2019 that admitted 




     












Evolution and Adaptation from this original model, opting for different policy 
As this historical progression shows, the number of 
countries employing points-based selection systems is 
growing at an increasing rate. That said, the points 
systems in these states are by no means identical. Indeed, 
as the number of such systems has grown and existing 
points systems have become more established, these 
systems have become increasingly diverse in their 
structure, details, and application. 
The following section addresses the commonalities and 
variations among the points systems employed in various 
countries. First, it describes what legal and policy scholars 
have generally regarded as the “traditional” or “classic”
form of the points system. Next it discusses how existing 
points systems have diverged from this “traditional”
model across a number of policy dimensions. Finally, it 
summarizes some of the explanations given for why the 
spread of points-based immigration selection systems and 
other similar policy innovations have resulted not in 
convergence but in a set of variations on a common 
theme. 
The “Traditional” or “Classic” Points System
The points systems introduced in Canada in 1967 and 
Australia in 1972 are often used as a baseline, providing 
the template for what is commonly referred as the 
“classic”42 or “traditional”43 model. This type of points 
system is generally characterized as a policy tool that is 
used to manage a single visa stream for high-skilled 
foreign workers44 through which qualified applicants 
apply directly for a permanent residence visa.45 This 
points system is employed early in the application review 
process, serving as a pre-entry screening mechanism that 
helps to determine whether a given applicant is eligible 
for entry. Under such a system, applicants are not 
required to have arranged employment or a sponsoring 
employer,46 and admissions decisions are administered 
through a first-come, first-served single-step selection 
47process. 
Variations on the “Traditional” or “Classic” Model
Many of the points systems implemented in countries 
other than Canada and Australia, and the later iterations of 
Canada’s and Australia’s points systems, share many of
these policy features. Many, however, have also diverged 
choices in one or more ways. 
Single, High-Skilled Visa Stream 
The historical association between points systems and 
skilled immigration still exists. Most points-based 
immigration selection systems are used in high-skilled 
immigration programs. These include Canada’s Federal 
Skilled Worker program, Australia’s three points-tested 
skilled visas, New Zealand’s Skilled Migrant Category
program, Austria’s Red-White-Red Card program, 
Japan’s Preferential Treatment for Highly Skilled Foreign 
Professionals program, Turkey’s Turquoise Card
program, and the “Category A” stream of China’s
Foreigner’s Work Permit program. 48 
That said, various states have created points-tested 
programs tailored to workers at lower skill levels. For 
example, Canada has one skilled visa program dedicated 
entirely to medium-skilled foreign workers (the Federal 
Skilled Trades program), one that admits both medium-
and high-skilled workers (the Canadian Experience Class 
program), and a number of provincial-level programs that 
admit either medium- or low-skilled workers.49 Similarly, 
medium-skilled workers whose occupation is included on 
Australia’s Shortage Occupation List are eligible to apply 
to any of that country’s three points-tested skilled visa 
programs (subclasses 189, 190, and 489). Those 
applicants are granted points for post-secondary 
professional qualifications that are not university 
degrees.50 Germany’s pilot points-tested program, the 
Punktebasiertes Modellprojekts für ausländische 
Fachkräfte (PuMa) (Points-Based Model Project for 
Foreign Professionals), was aimed at medium-skilled 
workers.51 And South Korea has a points-tested visa 
stream, the Employment Permit System (EPS), that is 
exclusively aimed at low-skilled foreign workers.52 
Other states have employed points systems in economic 
visa programs that do not include an explicit reference to 
applicants’ skill levels or the skill levels of their
professions. These points-tested but not skills-based visa 
programs have tended to be aimed at investors, self-
employed business owners, entrepreneurs, and start-ups. 
Examples include Australia’s Business Innovation and 
Investment (Provisional) Visa (Subclass 188), 53 Canada’s
Immigrant Investor Program (IIP), 54 New Zealand’s








Work Visa programs,56 the Netherlands’ Investment Visa
Program,57 and South Korea’s D-8-4 (Start-Up Visa) 
58program. 
There has been a similar proliferation of policy options 
concerning the number of visa streams that any given 
points system is used to manage. Some countries set up a 
single overarching points system that applies to multiple 
visa streams. Other states set up multiple points systems, 
each linked to (and thus tailored to) a single visa program. 
Some states adopt a mix of these approaches. 
Policymakers in Canada and Australia have opted for the 
former approach. Both countries have set out points 
systems that apply to all their skilled-stream visa 
programs. (Australia has now established a second points 
system, and a second applicant pool, that is applied solely 
in its “Investment 2” visa program.) Austria’s Red-White-
Red (RWR) Card program adopts a similar approach, 
using a single points system in the application process for 
multiple kinds of residence permits, but diverges from the 
Canadian and Australian approaches by varying the 
number of points allocated to each factor depending on 
the type of residence permit for which an applicant is 
applying.59 Korea has four points-tested visa programs, 
also called “status of residence” programs, each of which 
employs a different points table.60 
Allocating Permanent Visas 
In the “classic” or “traditional” model, points systems
were used only in programs that allowed foreign workers 
to directly apply for permanent resident status, without 
requiring them to have held any provisional or temporary 
visa beforehand. Canada continues to follow this practice, 
directly allocating permanent residence visas in all its 
points-tested programs. 
Most of the other countries that have implemented points 
systems have moved away from this precedent. Some of 
these states have continued to employ points systems in 
programs that grant permanent visas but have also 
implemented one or more points-tested temporary or 
provisional visa programs. Australia, for example, has 
continued to allocate permanent residence permits to 
those admitted via its skilled independent visa program, 
but the country also has a number of points-tested 
temporary and provisional visa programs. Many of these 
latter programs have been set up as part of a wider shift in 
Australian policy toward a “two-step”61 approach to 
immigration in which foreign workers seeking permanent 
residence must first hold a temporary or provisional visa. 
New Zealand has also begun experimenting with points-
tested temporary visa programs. While it allocates 
permanent visas in both its Skilled Migrant and Investor 
visa programs,62 its more recently established 
Entrepreneur Work visa program grants only a temporary 
three-year visa.63 Austria’s RWR Card program has
multiple tiers, one that grants a six-month job-search 
visa,64 another that grants a one-year temporary visa 
(colloquially called an RWR Card), 65 and one that grants 
a permanent residence and work permit (called an RWR-
Plus Card).66 
Other states like the Netherlands, Denmark, and 
Singapore have limited their points systems to temporary 
or provisional visas. The Netherlands’ only points-tested 
visa program grants successful applicants a two-year 
(renewable) visa.67 Denmark’s now-shuttered Green Card 
program included two points-tested visa categories, both 
of which were temporary: a six-month job-search visa68 
and a three-year employment visa.69 Singapore’s only
points-tested visa program is the “S-Pass,” a temporary 
visa that allows “semi-“ or “mid-level” skilled workers to 
live and work in Singapore for two years.70 
Three recent examples use points systems exclusively in 
permanent visa programs. Hong Kong’s Quality Migrant
Admission Scheme, enacted as part of an effort to foster 
skilled immigration, aims to attract talented foreign 
workers by offering them permanent residence visas.71 
Malaysia’s Residence Pass for Talent (RP-T) program 
and Turkey’s Turquoise Card program also offer qualified 
foreign workers a direct path to permanent residence.72 
Use as Eligibility Screening Mechanism 
In the traditional model, an immigration points system is 
used early in the visa application process to assess 
whether applicants meet the eligibility requirements for a 
given visa program, to sort a pool of applicants so that 
immigration officers can select the most qualified 
candidates, or both. This is still the most common way in 
which points systems are used in the immigration regimes 
of countries that have implemented one or more points-
tested visa programs. 
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Some countries, however, have found other uses for 
points systems. For example, Japan and China have 
incorporated points systems as a secondary sorting 
mechanism in an otherwise largely employer-led labor 
immigration regime. Foreign workers seeking to 
immigrate to either of these countries must first obtain a 
job offer before applying for a visa. It is at this stage that 
these countries’ points systems are applied. Most foreign 
workers seeking to enter Japan or China are routed 
through these countries’ general, catch-all work visa 
programs: the Z Visa in China and the Working Visa in 
Japan. Highly qualified foreign applicants—those who 
score over 70 points on Japan's Points-Based System for 
Highly Skilled Foreign Professionals or more than 85 
points on China’s Working Foreigners Classification 
Scheme—may, however, be allowed to apply for alternate 
visa programs that admit only highly skilled foreign 
professionals. The visas issued through these alternate 
visa routes—China’s R Visa and Japan’s Highly Skilled 
Foreign Professional visa—grant foreign professionals all 
the privileges associated with general work visas as well 
as a range of additional privileges, including fewer 
restrictions on the types of work permitted, visas for 
spouses and children, visas for applicants’ parents or
household workers, preferential processing of subsequent 
immigration applications, and faster access to permanent 
residence. 73 Thus, these two points systems differ from 
those employed in more traditional models. Given that all 
applicants who would be eligible for these high-skilled 
visa programs would also be eligible for Japan’s or
China’s basic work visa, some authors have described 
these two points systems as less akin to entry exams and 
more to velvet ropes set at the entrance to the red carpet 
(or “green path”) leading to a VIP room.74 
Other states have even applied points systems to other 
actors in the labor immigration process. Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and South Korea have all set up points systems 
by which they evaluate employers seeking to employ 
foreign workers. Under Korea’s Employment Permit 
System (EPS) program, a temporary visa program (E-9) 
for low-skilled workers, employers’ applications to hire
foreign workers are scored according to a points test that 
includes factors such as “basic items” (a category that 
includes such measures as how many foreign workers an 
employer has hired in the past and how many Korean 
workers it hired in a given period), “bonus items” (a
category that rewards employers for doing things like 
fully paying for accident insurance, offering training for 
their workers, and maintaining a safe work environment), 
and “penalties” (a category that deducts points from
employers that have violated labor regulations in the past, 
have had foreign workers quit due to sexual harassment or 
physical/verbal abuse, or that are found to operate an 
unsafe working environment).75 Under this system, all 
employers’ applications are scored and then permits are
issued according to rank order until the program’s quota
is exhausted.76 
Job Offer/Employer Sponsor Requirement 
Under a traditional points system, applicants face few 
mandatory requirements.77 Aside from meeting certain 
minimum standards of health and character, such as 
vaccination, lack of criminal record, or adequate means of 
financial support, aspiring foreign workers may apply 
regardless of whether they had arranged employment in 
the destination state and without having to show evidence 
of labor market demand for their particular professional 
skills. That said, classic points systems did not ignore 
these indicators of employability. They just included them 
as criteria within the points table, rewarding applicants 
whose professions were in particular demand and those 
with arranged employment, but did not exclude applicants 
who failed to meet those criteria. 
A number of existing systems, however, have diverged 
from this traditional model. Many points systems have 
additional prerequisites that, if not satisfied, render a 
prospective foreign worker ineligible to apply. Some of 
these eligibility requirements may even address qualities 
that are also addressed in the points system. These 
include, for example, minimal levels of language 
proficiency, being below a maximum age, earning above 
a set minimum either in past salary or expected salary 
upon entry, being qualified to work in a profession that 
has been included on a government-compiled “shortage
occupation list,”78 passing a skills assessment,79 or having 
a job offer in hand.80 
Single-Step Versus Expression of Interest Selection 
Processes 
In a classic points system, the process of evaluating 
individual applications is relatively simple. Candidates 
are assigned a given number of points for each criterion in 







any applicant whose points total equals or exceeds a 
specified “pass mark” is deemed eligible for a visa.81 In 
this traditional “grading” procedure, individuals’
applications are evaluated according to an absolute82 
assessment model under which their score totals are 
assessed according to a fixed pass mark. This single-step, 
threshold, or pass/fail83 assessment structure is used in 
most points systems around the world, including those in 
China, Denmark, Hong Kong, Japan, the Netherlands, 
South Korea, Singapore, and Turkey. 
In the last two decades, however, an alternative approach 
to applicant assessment has emerged. Under this new 
model—referred to as an “expression of interest”
model—there is still a pass mark and applicants are still 
assigned a total score based on a fixed points rubric. 
Applicants whose total points meet or exceed the pass 
mark are not, however, immediately deemed eligible to 
receive a visa. These candidates’ applications are instead 
placed in a “pool” of qualified candidates. All 
applications in the pool are ranked according to the 
number of points they have accrued. Immigration officials 
(and potentially employers or regional governments) then 
invite the highest scoring applicants to submit a full 
application. This expression of interest assessment model 
is thus a two-stage application process.84 Applicants are 
first graded on an absolute basis according to a fixed 
“pool pass mark.” They then are graded on a relative 
basis, with their score totals being compared to those 
earned by other applicants in the current applicant pool. 
Explanations for Spread and Variation 
As addressed above in our definition of points systems, all 
existing points systems share certain core characteristics: 
they employ explicit selection criteria and quantify the 
relative weight of each selection factor. In other words, a 
points-based selection system is a policy tool that offers 
policymakers a way to ensure that multiple, variously 
weighted selection criteria will be consistently applied to 
visa applications. In addition to this single universal 
characteristic, however, a number of other characteristics 
are shared by many existing points systems and their past 
iterations. In this, one could describe all these points 
systems as exhibiting a kind of “family resemblance”—a 
similarity marked less by universally shared 
characteristics than by multiple overlapping similarities.85 
This family resemblance is not the result of independent 
invention but rather of imitation. Policymakers have 
looked to existing points systems in other states for 
inspiration. This phenomenon—in which policymakers or 
jurists in one state look to policies, administrative 
structures, institutions, or legal concepts in another state 
as sources of guidance or templates to be imitated—is 
referred to in public policy and political science as 
“policy transfer”86 or “policy diffusion,”87 and in 
comparative law as “legal borrowing” or “legal 
transplantation.”88 Sources drawn from these subjects 
offer numerous examples, drawn from various areas of 
policy and law, suggesting that this process of cross-
border circulation of policy innovations commonly results 
in the kind of policy resonance among state policies that 
can be observed here. 
These same conceptual tools also account for the 
differences among points systems, and for the apparent 
increase in the variety of differences as the family of 
points-system states has grown. In surveying the literature 
on legal or policy borrowing, numerous reasons exist why 
policymakers seeking to import a legal framework or 
policy tool from abroad may not want, or be able, to do so 
through simple duplication. First, different governments 
have different policy goals, and different political 
moments may require different strategies and 
concessions. Each of these points systems was crafted by 
political actors with their own political priorities, tailored 
to address the concerns of a particular supporting 
coalition, and framed in terms designed to resonate with a 
specific public audience. Second, these foreign imports 
may need to be “translated” to make them fit within the 
policy context and legal culture of the borrowing state. 
Third, there is an imperative to iterate and improve, 
learning from and building upon the mistakes and 
successes of other states employing the policy or legal 
tool being imported. 
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Case Study—Canada’s Points-Based Immigration System 
§ 1 THE EVOLUTION OF CANADA’S SKILLED
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 
Until the late 1950s, the underlying policy goal that 
shaped Canada’s immigration policy was to entice large
numbers of new permanent residents that would help to 
settle and to “civilize” its vast territorial holdings, while 
also admitting only those potential immigrants that would 
allow Canada’s national character to remain essentially 
white-European.1 To this end, Canadian immigration 
policy welcomed migration from Britain and northern 
Europe while limiting or barring the entry of various 
“classes” of nonwhite immigrants through the use of
explicit geographical and racial preferences.2 
In the early 1960s, though, Canada faced intense domestic 
and international pressure to drop these restrictions. At 
home, Canada’s economy was booming and the domestic 
labor market couldn’t supply sufficient skilled labor. 
Abroad, Canadian officials supporting the wave of 
decolonization sweeping through the United Nations and 
the Anglophone Commonwealth faced criticism over the 
tension between their antiracist rhetoric abroad and their 
racially selective immigration laws at home. Spurred by 
these dual political demands, Canadian officials began to 
overhaul the nation’s immigration system, issuing 
regulations in 19623 that directed immigration officials to 
select candidates on the basis of “their education, training, 
skills and adaptability,”4 irrespective of their race or 
country of origin. 
This shift toward a more universal, economistic approach 
to immigration proved popular among policymakers and 
the public.5 But it soon became apparent that further 
reform and guidance were needed. While the 1962 
regulatory changes6 had included instructions for frontline 
immigration officers, directing them assess visa 
applicants based only on characteristics believed to 
predict a candidate’s capacity to integrate in and 
contribute to the Canadian economy (education, training, 
skills, and “adaptability”), immigration officers were
given no clear guidelines on how to measure or weigh 
these characteristics.7 Because officers retained such 
broad discretion over the application of the prescribed 
guidelines, rationales and selection outcomes varied 
among immigration officers. 
To solve this and other implementation problems,8 the 
Canadian government issued a second set of regulations 
in 1967,9 laying out a clear application review process and 
an objective scale against which applicants would be 
assessed.10 With this, Canada established the world’s first 
points-based immigration selection system. 
Under the first iteration of Canada’s points system, 
immigration officials graded applicants according to a 
rubric that established possible point values 
corresponding to nine characteristics: (1) education and 
training; (2) personal character; (3) occupational demand; 
(4) occupational skill; (5) age; (6) pre-arranged 
employment; (7) knowledge of French and English; (8) 
the presence of a relative in Canada; and (9) employment 
opportunities in their area of destination.11 Applicants’
scores in each of these categories were then added up, 
resulting in an overall points total. Using these points 
totals, admissions decisions were then made on a simple 
pass/fail basis. Candidates who had earned a points total 
that met or exceeded a set points threshold (or "pass 
mark”) of 50 out of 100 points were deemed eligible to
receive a permanent residence visa.12 
Each application was processed on a first-come, first-
served basis. This meant that each year, after targets for 
how many permanent economic immigrants would be 
admitted were set, immigration officials issued visas to 
approved applicants one by one until that target was met. 
Applicants whose points totals were sufficient for 
admission but who were not immediately granted 
admission because the yearly numerical targets had 
already been met kept their place in line and had a legal 
right to have their applications considered in future years 
once their numbers came up. 
Over the intervening five decades, Canadian officials 
have adjusted one or more of the parameters of this 
original points system more than a dozen times.13 Some of 
these adjustments were made in response to changes in 
external circumstances, such as the 1982 addition of a job 









    
 
response to an economic downturn.14 Regulations issued 
in 1986 removed that requirement to provide more skilled 
immigrants to fill the needs of a now-revived economy.15 
Some adjustments were made in response to perceived 
malfunctions or unforeseen consequences of the policy 
structure of the points system itself, such as in 1978 when 
policymakers facing claims that the points system was 
admitting too many “unemployable” but highly educated 
candidates reweighted the points table, making it more 
“labor-market relevant” by reducing the points granted for 
education and increasing the points allocated to “labour
market factors” like work experience.16 
Finally, the Canadian government made some 
adjustments over the years in response to shifting policy 
preferences and public opinion about whether points-
tested skilled migration should be weighted toward 
solving short-run labor shortages or building long-term 
human capital reserves. In its original 1967 form, the 
points system skewed strongly to the longer-term human 
capital side of this continuum. In 1978, the pendulum 
swung toward the other side of the continuum as 
lawmakers reweighted the points table in favor of 
“employability” factors, signaling a “clear shift toward 
greater alignment with labor market needs.”17 A few years 
later, the pendulum began to swing back, as lawmakers 
once again adjusted the points table, increasing the points 
allocated to education in 1986, in 1992, and again in 
1995.18 This swing toward long-term “human capital”
culminated in 2001’s Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act (IRPA), an omnibus overhaul of Canada's 
immigration law. The provisions of IRPA shifted 
Canada’s skilled immigration programs almost entirely
away from the goal of meeting short-term labor market19 
needs, casting them instead primarily as tools meant to 
help Canada prepare for its longer-term future.20 
Across the first three decades of its existence, the points 
system was remarkably responsive. Partly as a result of 
the clearly defined policy levers offered by Canada’s
transparent and quantified points system,21 most of the 
adjustments listed in the previous paragraphs did in fact 
bring about changes in the rate and composition of 
Canada’s skilled immigration flows that were in line with 
the intentions of Canadian officials.22 
In the mid 2000s, however, the responsiveness and 
flexibility of the points system started to break down. 
With its economy in the midst of a years-long expansion, 
and its “human capital” immigration model consistently
attracting the interest of high-skilled workers from around 
the world, Canada began to receive record numbers of 
applications for its skills-tested immigration programs. 
Although it was not unusual for these visa programs to 
have a backlog, this explosion of applications rapidly 
“out-paced both the government’s desired level of intake 
and the system’s operational capacity.”23 Faced with this 
deluge of new applications, its fifty-year-old application 
processing procedures couldn’t keep up, leading to the
development of a backlog of more than 600,000 
applications with an average processing time of three to 
five years.24 
After various attempts at minor fixes, in 2015 the 
Canadian government fundamentally reformed its skills-
tested immigration systems. As part of this reform, 
Canada replaced its single-test, first-come first-served 
admission system with a new two-stage selection system 
called “Express Entry”—an application management 
program designed to be at once more effective and 
efficient than its old system. 
§ 2 CANADA’S CURRENT SKILLED
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 
Canada’s current skilled immigration system is made up 
of three federal-level visa programs and various 
provincial-level programs through which skilled 
workers25 can receive permanent residence visas. The 
application and selection process for all three of the 
federal-level visa programs and most of the provincial-
level programs is administered through the Express Entry 
application management system. 
Canada’s Skilled Visa Programs 
Canada has three points-tested skilled visa programs at 
the federal level. First, the Federal Skilled Worker 
program is aimed at candidates that have the experience 
and training needed to work in positions in the top three 
skill levels of Canada’s National Occupation 
Classification system: managerial jobs, professional jobs, 
and technical jobs and skilled trades. The Federal Skilled 
Worker program is the most common route for skilled 
immigration into Canada. To be eligible for this program, 
a candidate must: (1) have at least one year of experience 
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advanced fluency in English or French; and (3) have at 
least a high school diploma or equivalent. 
Second, the Federal Skilled Trades program selects 
candidates whose work experience and training qualify 
them for certain technical jobs and skilled trades. To be 
eligible for the Federal Skilled Trades program, a 
candidate must: (1) have at least two years of full-time 
work experience (or an equal amount of part-time work 
experience) in one of the qualifying trades; (2) meet the 
job requirements to work in their chosen trade; (3) 
demonstrate a sufficient grasp of English or French to 
work in their chosen trade; and (4) have either a valid 
offer of full-time employment or have received a 
“certificate of qualification” in their chosen trade from a 
Canadian authority at the provincial, territorial, or federal 
level. 
Third, the Canadian Experience Class program is for 
applicants who have at least one year of full-time 
Canadian work experience within the last three years. 
Applicants must also meet the minimum language levels 
needed for their jobs. 
Canada also has a variety of visa programs that are jointly 
administered by Canada’s federal government and the
governments of its various provinces and territories. 
These Provincial Nominee Programs (PNPs) allow 
participating provinces and territories to address local 
labor market needs by selecting potential foreign workers 
and/or foreign students and nominating them for 
permanent residence visas. 
The Application and Selection Process 
Since 2015, foreign workers seeking a skilled visa to enter 
and work in Canada have been required to apply through 
the Express Entry system. The term “Express Entry”
refers both to Canada’s digital application management
system—an online database portal through which 
candidates’ information is gathered, stored, processed, 
and potentially matched with interested employers26—and 
to the two-step selection process that Canadian officials 
adopted in 2015. This new two-step selection process 
consists of an “Expression of Interest” phase and an 
“Invitation to Apply” phase, as illustrated in Figure 1. 









In the first step, foreign workers seeking a skilled visa 
begin by completing a candidate profile on the Express 
Entry web portal. Once completed and submitted, this 
profile is treated as an applicant’s “expression of interest”
(EOI). If the qualifications listed on a candidate’s profile
satisfy the minimum requirements of any of the three 
federal skilled visa programs,27 the candidate’s profile is
then scored according to a points rubric called the 
Comprehensive Ranking System (CRS). 
Just as in Canada’s pre-2015 points system, the CRS 
rubric assigns points to each candidate based on a range 
of factors, including education or training, occupational 
skills, occupational demand, age, fluency in English or 
French, experience working or attending school in 
Canada, and employer or provincial sponsorship. After 
this initial review and scoring, profiles are placed into a 
pool of eligible screened candidates. 
The second phase of the application process occurs when 
Canadian officials conduct a “drawing” or “selection 
round.” In these drawings, conducted one or two times
per month, all candidates currently in the Express Entry 
pool are ranked according to their CRS scores and the 
highest ranking applicants are sent an “Invitation to 
Apply,” allowing them to move on to the next step of the
application process. The number of invitations issued in 
each drawing is determined according to monthly targets 
set by the Ministry of Immigration, Refugees and 
Citizenship. Candidates who have received these 
invitations may28 then complete a full application, which 
is reviewed by immigration officials according to the visa 
program under which they are applying.29 Candidates 
whose full applications are approved are then issued a 
permanent residence visa. 
§ 3 LESSONS FROM CANADA 
Lesson 1: Canada has been remarkably successful 
in attracting foreign workers in general, and in 
attracting high-skilled foreign workers in 
particular. 
Canada has been and continues to be a leading destination 
for foreign workers at all skill levels. It has the largest 
permanent labor migration program among countries in 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD),30 the most highly educated 
foreign-born population in the world (with 60% of 
foreign-born residents having a tertiary degree),31 and the 
longest-standing and most elaborate points system in the 
world. Indeed, Canada is consistently ranked as one of the 
most desirable destination countries in the world. In a 
recent Gallup World Poll on migration, over 47 million 
potential migrants chose Canada as their top choice of 
destination, making Canada the second-most-desired 
destination country after the United States.32 This 
attractiveness appears to be particularly strong among 
skilled migrants, as suggested by a recent OECD study 
examining the attractiveness of destination countries in 
the eyes of highly qualified potential migrants. 
Respondents ranked Canada as one of the top five 
destination countries (alongside Australia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and New Zealand).33 
Canada’s popularity as a destination state is a function of
several pull-factors. It has a highly developed and open 
domestic economy, high safety and life expectancy rates, 
and a stable and comparatively responsive political 
system. It also has unusually high levels of domestic 
support for immigration among both Canadian officials 
and the Canadian population. This support may be driven 
in part by demographic necessity, as Canada is expected 
to face such large shortages of native-born workers in the 
coming decades that immigrant workers will account for 
all of Canada’s net labor force growth (3.7 million 
workers) between 2018 and 2040.34 It is likely also the 
result of a decades-long effort to incorporate 
multiculturalism into the national ethos.35 
In addition to these more general pull-factors, a recent 
study suggests that Canada’s extraordinary success in 
attracting skilled workers may be due in part to two key 
aspects of its skilled immigration programs: the use of a 
points-based selection system and the provision of a direct 
route to permanent residence for skilled migrants. 
In a 2017 study examining the effectiveness of various 
skill-selective migration policy designs, Czaika and 
Parsons found that even when controlling for an 
exhaustive list of economic, social, political, and other 
factors, these two policy features were associated with 
significant improvements in countries’ ability to attract 
high-skilled foreign workers. On average, this study 
found that countries that have established points-based 
skilled visa programs attract approximately 1.5 times the 









not,36 and that skilled immigrants make up a larger share 
of these countries’ overall labor migration flows.37 And 
the decision to offer skilled visa programs that provide 
immediate access to “permanency rights” Is associated 
with even larger effects. Countries offering skilled visas 
that grant permanency rights on arrival attract, on 
average, two times the number of high-skilled migrants as 
those that do not.38 
While there may be a number of possible explanations for 
the remarkable effectiveness of these two policy design 
elements, it is likely at least in part because points-based 
selection systems and immediate permanency visas 
reduce uncertainty costs for potential skilled migrants. 
Points systems reduce uncertainty before applying, 
allowing potential skilled migrants to estimate their 
likelihood of being offered entry, by clearly listing all 
selection criteria and their relative weights. (This reduced 
uncertainty logic may be even stronger for countries that 
employ two-step expression-of-interest systems, because 
such systems’ ranking functions effectively move the 
highest-scoring candidates to the front of the line, 
minimizing the risk that the most qualified applicants will 
not be offered visas due to quota limitations.39) Direct 
permanent skilled visas reduce uncertainty after 
admission by sparing admitted foreign workers many of 
the costs they would have faced if granted only temporary 
status, including the professional and personal costs of 
being constrained in their ability to change employers, the 
administrative and financial costs associated with 
renewing or converting a temporary visa, and the 
cognitive and emotional costs associated with being 
uncertain about their ability to stay in their destination 
country.40 
Lesson 2: Foreign workers admitted through 
Canada’s skilled visa programs enjoy largely 
positive economic outcomes and are generally 
well-incorporated into the labor market. 
According to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship 
Canada (IRCC) and Statistics Canada—the country’s two 
primary official sources of data on immigration flows and 
immigrant outcomes—positive economic outcomes for 
skilled immigrants living in Canada are generally quite 
strong. 
While short-term economic outcomes among newly 
arrived skilled foreign workers were once the Achilles’
heel of Canadian immigration, the share of highly skilled 
foreign workers (that is, primary visa applicants admitted 
through any one of Canada’s skilled visa programs) who 
report finding employment within the first year of their 
arrival in Canada has been steadily increasing since 
2005. 41 In 2016, the year that the Express Entry system 
fully took effect, 86% of skilled workers admitted in the 
prior year reported having found employment.42 Data 
gathered on subsequent cohorts of skilled foreign workers 
selected through Express Entry show that this rate has 
held largely steady at around 87%.43 In the medium- and 
longer-term, outcomes for skilled immigrants in Canada 
improve even further, with both employment rates and 
average earnings increasing with duration of residence in 
Canada. As of 2017, economic immigrants residing in 
Canada for five or more years were 15 to 24% more likely 
to be employed than Canadian natives, and their average 
salary was 106% of the Canadian average.44 
These positive labor market outcomes for skilled foreign 
workers have not been associated with any noticeable 
negative effects on labor market outcomes for native-born 
Canadians. Indeed, a number of studies have found that 
skilled immigration has—and likely will continue to 
have—a positive effect on Canada’s labor market and the 
wider economy.45 
Lesson 3: The longstanding success of Canada’s
points-based selection system would have been 
impossible without its robust and comprehensive 
data-gathering infrastructure. 
Canada’s points system has been in place for more than
five decades. During this time, Canadian immigration 
officials have made dozens of changes to the system’s
provisions and the processes, adjusting the system in 
response to changing circumstances and emerging 
challenges. For this ongoing process of policy adaptation 
to be successful, policymakers needed to have access to 
accurate, detailed, and reliable data on the characteristics 
and outcomes of those admitted through the system. To 
this end, Canada has built one of the most comprehensive 
immigration data-gathering infrastructures in the world. 
One core element of this immigration data infrastructure 
is the Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB), an 
administrative database containing data on every person 
who has migrated to Canada since 1982. The IMDB 









admissions files with information drawn from the tax 
returns they file in subsequent years. By incorporating 
these two sources of data, the IMDB allows researchers to 
examine not only patterns in the demographic and 
professional characteristics of migrants admitted to 
Canada through a given visa program but also trends in 
those individuals’ socioeconomic outcomes in the years
after their arrival. This dataset is an invaluable resource 
for immigration policymakers tasked with managing and 
adjusting Canada’s points-tested skilled visa programs, 
offering them a readily available source of information 
about the relationships between candidates’ educational 
and skill profiles and their short- and long-term economic 
and social outcomes.46 
Another element that contributes to the success of 
Canada’s immigration data infrastructure is the existence
of the Evaluation Division, an agency within Canada’s
Ministry of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship 
(IRCC). This Division is devoted entirely to monitoring 
the functioning of Canada’s immigration programs, 
including the integration of immigrants into the country’s
labor market and society. It also gives advice on needed 
policy adjustments.47 Canada is one of only a few 
countries to have a dedicated evaluation department 
within its immigration ministry.48 
The IMDB database, research and evaluations published 
by the IRCC’s Evaluation Department, and information 
from various other sources (including the Express Entry 
system itself)49 are gathered and stored through close 
cooperation between IRCC and Statistics Canada, and are 
made available to the public through Canada’s Open 
Government Portal.50 
Lesson 4: Canada’s two-step Express Entry 
application system is more efficient and responsive 
than the prior one-step system, and may be more 
effective at admitting candidates most likely to 
succeed. 
According to Canada’s IRCC, the Express Entry 
application management system was designed with a 
number of objectives in mind, including (1) increasing the 
speed of application processing, (2) allowing the IRCC a 
greater degree of flexibility in selection criteria and 
application management,51 and (3) improving economic 
and social outcome rates by accurately selecting those 
“candidates who are most likely to succeed 
economically.”52 
As to the first objective, Express Entry has undoubtedly 
increased the speed with which individuals’ applications
are processed. In 2014, the year before the launch of 
Express Entry, the IRCC had a backlog of over half a 
million unprocessed applications, and applicants faced 
processing times of three to five years.53 Since 2015, the 
IRCC has consistently processed 80% of skilled visa 
applications in less than six months.54 
This reduction in processing times is likely the result of a 
number of changes implemented through the adoption of 
the Express Entry system. One such change was the shift 
from a “paper logic” to a “digital logic.” This involved a
comprehensive effort to redesign the way the IRCC 
administered the points system, all but eliminating the 
reliance on paper records and ushering in fully digital 
application management, mass communication, and data 
collection.55 Another change was the move from a one-
step to a two-step application process. By automating the 
initial round of reviewing candidates’ credentials and 
allowing unselected EOI profiles to automatically exit the 
pool at expiration, the two-step expression-of-interest 
system alleviated much of the administrative burden 
associated with reviewing applications. 
As to the second objective, the Express Entry system does 
in fact grant immigration policymakers more flexibility in 
adjusting the points system’s criteria. Unlike the pre-2015 
points table, the point values and criteria included in the 
Comprehensive Ranking System points table are not set 
by statute. Instead, the criteria and point values—along 
with most other aspects of the Express Entry system—can 
be changed through Ministerial Instructions, a tool of 
administrative rulemaking that does not require 
parliamentary review.56 While some have questioned 
granting the Immigration Ministry this degree of 
discretion, this change undoubtedly makes the 
Comprehensive Ranking System points table a more 
flexible and dynamic policy tool, capable of being 
adjusted quickly to ensure that immigration targets are 
being met and that those invited to apply for residency 
have skills suited to the economy’s demands. 
As to the third objective, it is not yet possible to assess 
whether candidates selected through the Express Entry 















administrative data. Although the IMDB has been updated 
to include candidates admitted in 2015, the current 
version of the database does not include income 
information beyond the 2015 tax cycle. Furthermore, 
many of the applications processed between 2015 and 
2017 were not submitted through the Express Entry 
system but rather were part of the backlog of applications 
submitted before 2015.57 Given this small sample size and 
short time span, it is not yet possible to reliably assess the 
comparative effectiveness of the Express Entry’s selection 
mechanisms using the IMDB administrative data alone. 
That said, preliminary data from a survey conducted by 
the IRCC in 2018 suggests that candidates selected and 
admitted through Express Entry may in fact perform 
better on at least two metrics of economic outcomes. The 
survey, distributed to foreign workers admitted between 
2015 and 2018, compared the rates of employment and 
median wages of those who applied through Express 
Entry and those who had applied under the pre-2015 
system. Twelve months after admission, 87% of those 
who had applied through Express Entry had secured a job, 
compared with 82% of pre-2015 system applicants. 
Similarly, the candidates selected through Express Entry 
had a higher mean and median income than the pre-2015 
system applicants.58 
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Chapter 4: 
Case Study—Australia’s Points-Based Immigration System 
§ 1 THE EVOLUTION OF AUSTRALIA’S SKILLED
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 
In the early 1970s, the Australian government reoriented 
the country’s immigration system away from simply 
adding people toward economic nation-building. This 
policy shift occurred partly because of economic 
pressures. After the Second World War and through the 
1960s and 1970s, the Australian economy grew rapidly, 
putting increasing pressure on its domestic labor market. 
Partly in response to growing labor market shortfalls, 
Australian officials implemented a series of immigration 
reforms aimed at increasing the inflow of qualified 
foreign workers.1 This increase was accomplished partly 
by raising caps on economic migration and partly by 
removing immigration restrictions adopted under the 
decades-old “White Australia”2 policy that had favored 
migrants from the United Kingdom, the British 
Commonwealth, and Europe. The decision to admit more 
foreign workers, and to admit workers who hailed from 
countries outside Europe and the British Commonwealth, 
was controversial. But the policymakers behind these 
changes ultimately swayed political and public support, 
arguing that Australia’s economic future depended in 
large part on its ability to “attract more highly skilled 
workers, inventors, and entrepreneurs from Asia and 
elsewhere.”3 
In 1973, Australian lawmakers changed the regulations 
governing how immigration officers were to assess visa 
applications, reducing their discretion and requiring them 
to employ a merit-based qualitative assessment rubric. 
This assessment rubric encompassed many of the same 
factors as the then-newly implemented Canadian points 
system. However, it stopped short of quantifying or 
giving specific weighting guidelines for the various 
factors to be considered. In 1979, Australia further 
formalized its immigration selection guidelines, adopting 
a points system that was similar to the Canadian points 
system at the time.4 Australian officials allocated a 
numerical weight to criteria such as age, education, 
occupational skill, assessed capacity to adapt to 
Australian values, and presence of family in Australia. 5 
Over the years, Australia revised its points system several 
times. For example, in 1992 Australia introduced two new 
visa classes, under which states and territories could 
sponsor certain economic migrants. In 2007, Australia 
revised the criteria for the subclass through which 
students and holders of provisional temporary visas could 
apply for permanent residence, placing greater emphasis 
on language proficiency and relevant work experience. 
In 2010, Australia shifted the focus of its skilled 
migration stream away from “supply-driven” independent
skilled migration toward “demand-driven” migration, in 
the form of employer and government-sponsored skilled 
migration.6 The changes included establishing priority 
processing arrangements under which applicants who had 
received either government or employer sponsorship 
would be processed before independent (non-sponsored) 
candidates (an express change from the prior first-come-
first-served processing order), and phasing out existing 
skills lists and replacing them with a skilled occupation 
list to fill structural needs.7 
In 2011, Australia revised its points test again to try to 
end a years-long backlog (caused by slow application 
processing and a first-come-first-served system under 
which applicants who had submitted a complete 
application were guaranteed consideration) and a 
perceived inflexibility of program criteria.8 Among other 
things, Australia created a two-step process for points 
applications: First, applicants file an expression of interest 
in immigrating to Australia. Then, if they pass a certain 
score on the points test, they can file a formal 
immigration application. 
§ 2 AUSTRALIA’S CURRENT SKILLED
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 
Australia’s current skilled immigration system is made up 
of two federal-level points-tested visa programs.9 The 
application and selection process for all three of these 
programs is administered through the SkillSelect 






Australia’s Skilled Visa Programs 
The first of Australia’s points-tested skilled visa programs 
is the Skilled Independent visa (subclass 189). This visa 
program is aimed at candidates who have the experience 
and training needed to work in an occupation on 
Australia’s Medium and Long-term Strategic Skills List. 
The Skilled Independent visa program has generally been 
the route through which most skilled immigrants entered 
Australia, but in recent years it has been closely 
followed—and in some years surpassed—by the 
Employer Sponsored visa program.10 To be eligible for 
the Skilled Independent visa program, a candidate must 
be under 45 years old; meet certain health, character, and 
English language requirements; meet a minimum score 
(currently 65 out of 120) on a points test; and obtain a 
successful migration skills assessment outcome in their 
occupation.11 
Australia’s second points-tested skilled visa program is 
the State/Territory and Regional Nominated visa 
subcategory. This program contains two visa 
subcategories: the State/Territory and Regional 
Nominated stream of the Skilled Nominated visa 
(subclass 190) and the Skilled Regional visa (subclass 
887). These visa programs are aimed at the same kinds of 
skilled workers as the Skilled Independent (189) visa. 
The 190 visa can be obtained without having held any 
prior Australian visa, whereas the 887 is a dedicated 
permanent visa avenue for individuals who have held 
certain temporary or provisional visas for at least two 
years. These visa programs are largely similar in structure 
and eligibility requirements to the Independent Skilled 
(189) visa described above. 
To be eligible for a 190 visa, a candidate must satisfy all 
the same basic requirements as a 189 visa, including 
being under 45 years old; meeting certain health, 
character, and English language requirements; earning a 
minimum score (currently 65 out of 120) on a points test; 
and obtaining a successful migration skills assessment 
outcome in their occupation.12 In addition to these 
common requirements, candidates for a 190 visa must 
also obtain a nomination from one of Australia’s states or
territories. 
The criteria that applicants need to fulfill to receive a 
nomination vary from state to state and territory to 
territory. Common criteria include having an occupation 
listed on a state’s or territory’s own shortage occupation 
list, having a job offer from an employer in that state or 
territory, and agreeing to live and work within the 
nominating state or territory for a period of time (usually 
two or three years).13 Another notable difference between 
these regional visas and the 189 visa is that candidates can 
be eligible for these visas even if their occupation does 
not appear on the Medium and Long-term Strategic Skills 
List, so long as their occupation appears on the Short-term 
Skilled Occupation List. 
In addition to these two skills-based and points-tested visa 
programs, Australia has a variety of other visa programs 
that are either (a) aimed at selecting skilled workers but 
are not points tested or (b) employ a points test but are not 
aimed at selecting skilled workers. The former category 
includes Australia’s Employer Sponsored permanent visa
programs: the Employer Nomination Scheme visa 
(subclass 186) and the Regional Sponsored Migration 
Scheme visa (subclass 187). 14 Candidates for these visa 
programs are not subjected to a points test, but they must 
have a profession that appears on the Medium and Long-
term Strategic Skills List. 15 The latter category includes 
certain parts (notably the Business Innovation stream and 
the Investor stream) of the Business Innovation and 
Investment (Provisional) visa (subclass 188) program.16 
The Application and Selection Process 
Since 2012, foreign workers seeking an employment-
based visa to Australia must apply through the SkillSelect 
system. This system employs an Expression of Interest 
(EOI) model, in which the process of selecting foreign 
workers includes two steps. 
In the first step, foreign workers seeking a skilled visa 
begin by completing a candidate profile on the SkillSelect 
web portal.17 As part of their profile, candidates must 
“nominate” a career for which they qualify. In this regard 
Australia differs from Canada’s Express Entry system, 
which does not allow candidates to select their chosen 
visa programs and instead automatically sorts candidates 
into visa programs according to qualification and 
availability. By contrast, Australia’s SkillSelect system
requires candidates to select the visa programs for which 
they would like to be considered. SkillSelect candidates 









Candidate submits completed profile on 
SkillSelect system ( administered by Australia's 
Department of Home Affairs), stating their 
occupation and designating which visa 
subclass( es) for which they would like to be 
considered. 
Does candidate meet health, character, 
debt and language requirements, and 
old qualifications required to work in an 
occupation on the Medium- and Long­
Term Strategic Skills List (MLTSSL)? 
;---------------- -----, 
1 Candidate obtains Skills Assessment and any other : 
: required verification (e.g. proof of English proficiency, 1 
1 educational credential verification, etc) at any point 1 
Profile placed in 
SkillSelect applicant 
pool, ranked by points 
score prior to submitting completed application 
1 , _____ _ - - - -,-
Candidate's profile 
remains in pool 
Candidate submits completed 
No 
Candidate profile 
deemed invalid. May 
apply again with new 
profile. 
No 
Does candidate score at least 65 points 




Has the annual maximum ( ceiling) for 
candidate's stated profession been 
reached this year? 
ls candidate's score 
above the "invitation 
cutoff" (points 
threshold) for the 
current monthly draw? 
":J~'" application (including all supporting ._ ____ _;1111,,1 documentation) within 60 days of Immigration & Citizenship official reviews application according according to the visa program specified on !TA 
Yes,------11.i 
Candidate receives 
Invitation to Apply 
(!TA) 
receiving !TA 
Applicant not issued 
visa, but may apply 




Candidate is issued a 
permanent residence 
visa 
Once completed and submitted, this profile is treated as 
an applicant’s expression of interest. Each candidate’s
profile is scored according to a points table that assigns 
points based on a range of factors, including age, fluency 
in English, educational qualifications, past study or work 
in Australia, fluency in one of Australia’s community
languages, and the skills and qualifications of the 
candidate’s partner or spouse (if applicable). If the 
qualifications listed on a candidate’s profile satisfy the
minimum requirements of any of the visa programs they 
listed on their EOI profile, that candidate’s profile is
placed into a “pool” of eligible screened candidates. 
The second phase of the application process occurs when 
Australian officials conduct a “drawing” or “invitation 
round.” In these drawings, all candidates currently in the 
SkillSelect pool are ranked according to their point 
scores. The highest-ranking applicants are sent an 
“Invitation to Apply” (ITA). These invitation rounds are 
conducted monthly. Only candidates who have received 
an ITA can move on to the next step of the application 
18process. 
The number of invitations issued in each drawing is 
determined according to monthly targets set by the 
Department of Home Affairs. Candidates who have 
received invitations may19 complete a full application, 
which is then reviewed by immigration officials 
according to the visa program under which they are 
applying. Candidates whose full applications are 
approved are then issued a permanent residence visa. The 
process is illustrated in Figure 2. 







§ 3 LESSONS FROM AUSTRALIA 
Lesson 1: Australia has been remarkably successful 
in attracting foreign talent. 
Australia has welcomed and depended upon international 
migration for many years. Over the last two decades, it 
has become a leading destination for skilled foreign 
workers. Between 2000 and 2010, the number of highly 
skilled immigrants in Australia doubled, and that number 
has only continued to grow since then.20 In a recent study 
of the relative attractiveness of OECD countries among 
highly qualified workers, Australia came in first, followed 
closely by Sweden, Switzerland, New Zealand, and 
Canada.21 
Australia’s popularity as a destination state is likely a 
function of several pull-factors. As with Canada, 
Australia has a highly developed and open domestic 
economy, high safety and life expectancy rates, and a 
stable and comparatively responsive political system. In 
addition to these, it has a warm climate and a desirable 
“national lifestyle.”22 And as with Canada, Australian 
officials and the Australian public generally exhibit high 
levels of support for immigration and immigrants, an 
outgrowth perhaps of a similar decades-long effort to 
embrace multiculturalism in Australian politics and 
Australian education.23 
In addition to these more general pull-factors, Australia’s
success in attracting skilled workers may also be due in 
part to two key aspects of its skilled immigration 
programs: the use of a points-based selection system and 
the provision of a direct route to permanent residence for 
skilled migrants. In their 2017 study, discussed in more 
detail in the Canada chapter, Czaika and Parsons found 
that countries that operate points-based skilled visa 
programs attract an average of 1.5 times the number of 
high-skilled migrants as countries that lack such 
programs.24 Moreover, countries that offer skilled visa 
programs that provide immediate access to “permanency 
rights” attract, on average, 2 times the number of high-
skilled migrants as countries that do not.25 
Lesson 2: Foreign workers admitted through 
Australia’s skilled visa programs enjoy largely
positive outcomes and are generally well-
incorporated into the labor market. 
Skilled migrants (that is, primary applicant migrants in 
Skill Stream visas) in Australia demonstrate employment 
outcomes that are similar to, and in some ways 
significantly better than, those of the Australian general 
population. According to survey data from Australia’s
Department of Home Affairs, the labor force participation 
rate among permanent migrants admitted to Australia in 
2017 at six months after their arrival was 88.4%, and their 
unemployment rate was 7.0%.26 By contrast, the general 
Australian labor force participation rate at the time was 
64.7% and the unemployment rate was 5.7%.27 
These participation and employment outcomes were both 
markedly improved when these same skilled migrants 
were surveyed 18 months after arrival. At that point the 
labor force participation rate of skilled migrants increased 
to 94% and the unemployment rate fell to 2.8%.28 At the 
time of this second round of surveys, the labor force 
participation and unemployment rates among the general 
Australian population both held largely steady, with the 
former increasing slightly to 65.5% and the latter 
decreasing slightly to 5.5%.29 
Notably, these positive labor market outcomes for skilled 
foreign workers have not been associated with any 
noticeable negative effects on the domestic labor market 
or on labor market outcomes for native-born Australians. 
A recent academic study concluded that there is “almost 
no evidence” for the proposition that skilled immigration 
negatively affects outcomes for native-born Australians,30 
and an analysis by the Migration Council of Australia 
concludes that skilled foreign workers have in fact had 
significant positive effects on Australia’s labor market 
and the wider economy, with few appreciable negative 
effects on employment outcomes for native Australians.31 
Lesson 3: Australia is a model of how points-based 
skilled visa programs can complement employer-
sponsored visa programs. 
As discussed in more detail in the U.S. chapter, we 
propose that the United States establish a points-based 
visa program, not as a replacement for its existing 





them. We chose this policy proposal partly for practical 
reasons. Adopting a points system by adding a new visa 
track would be comparatively less costly, both politically 
and economically, than overhauling the United States’
existing economic visa infrastructure. But we also chose 
this policy design because, by operating both a points-
tested independent skilled visa program as well as 
continuing existing economic visa streams, the United 
States could reap the benefits of both. The existing 
employer-driven visa programs will ensure that the short-
run needs of the U.S. labor market are met, while the 
points-tested independent visa program will help to 
address the longer-term needs of the U.S. human capital 
infrastructure. 
Australia provides a useful real-world test of this 
proposition because, unlike Canada, Australia currently 
operates its employer sponsorship as a separate stream 
alongside the rest of its skill stream visas. Prospective 
foreign workers wishing to apply for one of Australia’s
two employer sponsored visa programs—the Employer 
Nomination Scheme (ENS, subclass 186) and the 
Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS, subclass 
187)—are not subject to a points test, and they apply 
through a different online system that is separate from 
SkillSelect.32 
The move toward dividing Australia’s supply-and-
demand-driven economic visa streams began with reforms 
announced in February 2010, explicitly reworking the 
skilled independent visa programs to meet medium- to 
long-term skill needs while allowing the employer-
sponsored visa programs to address more immediate 
needs.33 
Data on the economic outcomes of foreign workers 
admitted to Australia through these two streams suggests 
that operating both demand- and supply-driven visa 
streams has resulted in a pool of foreign workers with 
largely complementary traits. Migrants entering Australia 
through an employer-sponsored visa program tend, on the 
one hand, to have higher rates of short-term employment, 
lower levels of mobility, and lower levels of skills 
mismatch than those who entered via a skilled 
independent visa. On the other hand, they also tend to be 
older, less educated, and less diverse in their gender and 
countries of origin.34 Independent skilled migrants tend to 
have poorer employment rates in the short term. However, 
they tend to be higher skilled and have higher mobility; 
their rates of employment and over-qualification converge 
with their employer-sponsored peers as their duration of 
stay extends past three to four years; and they command 
higher salaries than employer-sponsored visa holders in 
the long run.35 
Lesson 4: Australia’s robust and consistent data-
collection programs have been vital to the 
successful management of its points-based visa 
programs. 
Australia has offered points-based skilled visas for more 
than four decades. Over this time, as discussed earlier in 
this chapter, Australian officials have made various 
adjustments to the weighting and categories addressed in 
the points table itself, the form and content of the 
occupation lists used in the application process, and the 
number and provisions of the specific visa programs to 
which the points test has been applied. Each of these 
adjustments was made according to changes in the 
economic or political climate within and outside 
Australia, or perceived malfunctions of the points system 
itself.36 The success of policymakers’ efforts to continue
to adapt Australia’s points system to new and emerging 
challenges depends on their having access to accurate, 
detailed, and reliable data on the characteristics and 
outcomes of those admitted through the visa programs 
that use this points system. To this end, Australian 
immigration officials have built up an impressive array of 
performance monitoring and data-gathering tools. 
One of these tools is the Continuous Survey of Australia's 
Migrants (CSAM). 37 Created in 2009 and administered by 
the Department of Home Affairs, this survey program 
examines the labor market outcomes (and other settlement 
and integration outcomes) of recently arrived permanent 
migrants in Australia. The CSAM surveys migrants 
arriving through both Skill stream and Family stream visa 
programs, gathering data on economic outcomes—as well 
as a variety of individual characteristics that may be 
relevant to labor market outcomes (such as gender, 
education level, age, and English language ability)—for 
both primary and secondary applicant migrants (e.g., 
accompanying family members).38 To gather both static 
outcome data and data showing the changes in outcomes 
over time, the CSAM consists of two survey rounds: an 
introductory survey issued to migrants six months after 
their arrival in Australia (also referred to as “the six-
39 
 month stage of settlement”) and a second follow-up 
survey issued 18 months after arrival (the “18-month 
stage of settlement”). 39 
In addition to the survey-based outcome data gathered by 
the CSAM, there are at least three major sources of 
information on immigration outcomes that are based on 
administrative data. The first of these is the SkillSelect 
system itself. Given its design as a fully digital 
application management system, SkillSelect data records 
information on the characteristics of candidates 
submitting EOI profiles, those selected to receive 
invitations to apply, and those whose applications were 
ultimately processed.40 The other two are the Personal 
Income Tax and Migrants Integrated Dataset (PITMID) 
and the Australian Census and Migrants Integrated 
Dataset (ACMID). These two datasets were created by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics in 2013 and 2016, 
respectively. PITMID contains information on recent 
permanent and provisional migrant taxpayers’ personal 
income generated by linking the Australian Taxation 
Office Personal Income Tax records with migrant records 
41from the Australian Government’s Settlement Database. 
ACMID provides information about the location, 
household characteristics, and other residence 
characteristics of permanent migrants in Australia 
generated by linking Australian Census data with 
Permanent Migrant Settlement Data gathered by the 
Department of Home Affairs. 42 
Lesson 5: Australia’s two-step SkillSelect 
application system and reforms implemented at 
the same time have improved efficiency, reduced 
costs, and lowered burdens on applicants. 
When the Australian government rolled out the 
SkillSelect application system in 2012, their stated 
objectives were largely similar to those set by Canadian 
officials when launching their Express Entry program 
three years later. The SkillSelect system would, in the 
words of Australia’s then-Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship (succeeded by the Department of Immigration 
and Border Protection), offer Australian officials a greater 
degree of control over the rates and composition of 
economic migration,43 reduce backlogs by improving 
administrative efficiency,44 and attract the “best and 
brightest intending migrants” from around the world.45 
SkillSelect has accomplished all three objectives. First, 
the two-stage EOI application process has given 
immigration officials a greater degree of control over the 
rate and composition of economic immigration controls. 
This was accomplished partly because, under the two-
stage EOI application system, immigration officials set 
the number of invitations to apply issued in each draw, 
allowing them to adjust the pipeline of visa applications 
awaiting processing at any one time according to the 
needs of the Australian job market and the processing 
capacity of the immigration officers tasked with 
reviewing visa applications. 46 It was also partly 
accomplished through reforms passed alongside 
SkillSelect that give the Department greater capacity to 
adjust the parameters of Skill Stream visa programs 
without seeking parliamentary approval.47 
Second, the SkillSelect system has reduced application 
backlogs and processing times. Indeed, there was not only 
a sharp decrease in processing time that occurred between 
the old system and the adoption of SkillSelect, but 
processing times have continued to fall since then, with 
average processing times falling sharply over the period 
in which SkillSelect has been operating.48 
These improvements in application processing times, 
along with the ranking function of the two-step EOI 
system, have both contributed to the third objective. The 
highest-scoring candidates are more likely to receive 
invitations to apply and are likely to receive these 
invitations sooner than those with lower points, making it 
more likely that these candidates will be admitted.49 And, 
once they apply, because they will find out more quickly 
about the outcome of their applications, these highly 
desirable candidates are less likely to have received jobs 
or migration offers elsewhere.50 
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Recommendations for the United States 
§ 1 CURRENT U.S. EMPLOYMENT-BASED 
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 
The United States has the largest immigration system in 
the world. Each year, more than 10 million people enter 
the United States on temporary visas, and about 1 million 
people receive permanent residence visas, also known as 
green cards. These overall immigration flows are divided 
roughly into four streams: family, economic or 
employment-based, humanitarian, and the diversity visa 
program. 
Although the totals vary from year to year, about 65% of 
the permanent visas issued by the United States each year 
are issued to migrants entering through a family-
sponsored visa, about 12% are issued to economic or 
employment-based migrants, about 15% are issued to 
those entering for humanitarian reasons (e.g., as refugees 
or asylees), and about 4% are issued through the diversity 
visa program. See Figure 3 below. 
In the United States’ current economic immigration 
stream, about 140,000 permanent visas are available each 
year. These are allocated across five employment-based 
categories (formally known as “preferences”). The 
employment-based first preference category (EB-1) is for 
people with extraordinary ability, as well as outstanding 
professors and researchers, and certain executives and 
managers. EB-2 is for people who have advanced degrees. 
EB-3 is for other professionals, as well as skilled and 
unskilled workers. EB-4 is for certain miscellaneous 
workers, such as religious ministers. EB-5 is for certain 
immigrant investors. The 140,000 total includes both 
principal workers and their spouses and children. Most 
employment-based immigrants must have an employer to 
sponsor them. Most of the time, an employer who seeks to 





hire a foreign worker permanently must first obtain a 
certification from the Department of Labor stating that 
there is no U.S. worker who is qualified and available for 
the same position. The employer must also prove that 
hiring the foreign worker will not affect the wages and 
working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers. 
This is known as the labor certification process. 
The current employment-based immigration system in the 
United States, whether temporary or permanent, selects 
for the short-term, specific labor needs of certain 
employers, not the long-term human capital needs of the 
United States. 
§ 2 GOALS OF PROPOSED POINTS-BASED PILOT 
PROGRAM 
Pressure Relief: Providing Additional Capacity for 
High-Skilled Immigration Without Changing 
Existing Skilled Visa Programs 
As noted in the first chapter of this report, the United 
States’ current immigration system is failing U.S. 
employers and the country in a variety of ways. These 
failures are likely to become more serious in the near 
future, as the U.S. economy undergoes significant 
changes in the face of challenges like the COVID-19 
pandemic, automation, an aging workforce, and growing 
skills “mismatches” across sectors and geographic
regions.1 
Although there is ample evidence suggesting that even a 
moderate increase in skilled immigration would benefit 
the country,2 for 30 years the U.S. Congress has failed to 
reform the employment-based green card categories. By 
providing an alternate avenue for 50,000 skilled workers 
to enter each year, our proposal presents a way to relieve 
pressure on existing visa programs without changing 
current categories. 
Proof of Concept: Providing a Low-Cost, Low-Risk 
Path to Testing the Efficacy of an Immigration 
Points Program in the United States 
As detailed in prior chapters, the data have shown how 
immigration points programs benefit Canada and 
Australia. However, we cannot adopt their models 
wholesale. The reasons given for this uncertainty vary 
from source to source, but they generally include 
questions of scale and government structure. 
While Canada and Australia are similar to the United 
States in many ways, including shared cultural roots, legal 
traditions, and economic orientations, they also differ in 
important ways. For example, Canada and Australia are 
significantly smaller than the United States in terms of 
population, economic output, and yearly immigration 
flows. Given these significant differences, we don’t have
confidence that simply importing a Canadian or 
Australian points system to the United States would work. 
The governmental structure in the United States also 
differs significantly from that in Australia and Canada. 
Australia and Canada have parliamentary systems that 
have delegated much immigration responsibility, 
including making changes to their points systems, to their 
immigration ministries. Congress cannot move quickly 
enough to provide the sustained and responsive tinkering 
necessary for a points program to function effectively. 
For these reasons, we propose a low-cost, low-risk path. 
Because our immigration points program would be 
implemented as a small pilot program, questions 
regarding the feasibility of a points program here in the 
United States could be explored in a real-world setting, 
and could be addressed in a staged manner. And the 
question of whether a points program could be 
successfully scaled up to manage all employment-based 
immigration to the United States could be postponed for 
at least ten years. By then empirical evidence will help 
answer that question. 
Filling a Policy Gap: Providing for Long-Term 
Economic and Social Needs of the United States 
The United States’ existing employment-based visa 
programs—both temporary and permanent—are generally 
oriented toward meeting the short-term needs of U.S. 
employers. These programs are designed to select those 
candidates that fulfill an immediate need of a U.S. 
employer that it cannot fulfill otherwise due to a gap in 
the U.S. labor market.3 
There are two problems with relying on the labor 
certification system as the primary means of selecting 
economic immigrants. First, the interests of U.S. 
employers are not identical to the interests of the United 
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States as a nation-state or of its residents as a collective 
polity. Second, the elected lawmakers charged with 
setting U.S. immigration policy have a fiduciary duty to 
provide not only for the short-term needs of particular 
companies, and the nation’s economy and labor market, 
but also for the country’s long-term economic success and 
health. The labor certification system is structurally ill-
suited to address either problem. There is, therefore, a gap 
in U.S. immigration policy. 
Establishing a modest points-based selection program 
would allow lawmakers to fill this gap. Because the 
selection criteria of points-based programs are set by 
government officials, these programs can be adjusted over 
time to accommodate the evolving needs and interests of 
the state and the public interest, not just to fill jobs. And 
because their criteria for selection include factors other 
than employer sponsorship or a job offer, policymakers 
can use points programs to select candidates for 
permanent immigration with the kinds of skills, 
experience, and capabilities that they believe will 
contribute to the country’s long-term success. 
Moreover, by establishing this points program alongside 
the existing labor certification system, U.S. policymakers 
will be able to fill this gap while allowing each of these 
programs to remain tailored to their respective goals. The 
existing labor certification programs need not be altered 
to consider longer-term economic goals or interests 
beyond those of domestic employers, and the points 
program need not include factors whose inclusion is 
driven by questions of short-term employability. 
§ 3 DETAILS OF PROPOSED PROGRAM 
Selection Criteria and Point Values/Weights 
Because the capacity to and likelihood of making these 
future contributions cannot be measured directly, our 
program—like all other immigration points programs—
instead selects candidates based on a series of 
characteristics that are indirectly correlated with the 
likelihood of economic success and social integration of 
foreign workers. 
Moreover, because our pilot program is meant to augment 
and not to replace the current U.S. employment-based 
immigration program, and given that the structure of the 
current labor certification and employer sponsorship 
program leads to the selection of foreign workers on the 
basis of short-term need, we have designed our points 
rubric (Table 1)—both in the selection of criteria and in 
the weights allocated to each—to select for individuals 
most likely to contribute to the success of the United 
States in the longer term. 
In reviewing this points rubric, the reader should also 
notice another design choice: that of the scale and range 
of the possible points values. With any numerically scaled 
assessment, the choice of numerical scale is somewhat 
arbitrary. But in making a selection of which scale to use, 
one should aim for a scale that is both intuitively 
understandable and a range that is wide enough to 
accommodate fine distinctions and adjustments. With 
these guidelines in mind, we chose to set our maximum 
possible points value at 1,000. This maximum is a factor 
of ten, making scores calculated in relation to that 
maximum more easily understood at an intuitive level. 
Although 100 may be an even more intuitive total, and 
one we could have used given that all our current points 
allocations are reducible by a factor of ten, we opted for 
the larger 1,000-point maximum to give future lawmakers 
the ability to make finer adjustments and distinctions 
among factors in future revisions. 
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% of Max. 
Possible 
Total) 
Points Allocation Guidelines 
Education Highest Degree 
Earned 





50 5% >1 postsecondary degree earned from U.S. 
institution: 50 points 
Age 100 10% 18 - 29 years of age: 100 points 
30 years of age: 95 points 
31 years of age: 90 points 
32 years of age: 85 points 
33 years of age: 80 points 
34 years of age: 75 points 
35 years of age: 70 points 
36 years of age: 65 points 
37 years of age: 60 points 
38 years of age: 55 points 
39 years of age: 50 points 
40 years of age: 45 points 
41 years of age: 35 points 
42 years of age: 25 points 
43 years of age: 15 points 
44 years of age: 5 points 





100 10% Superior English: 100 points 
Proficient English: 80 points 
Competent English: 60 points 
Other Language 
Proficiency 
50 5% Superior 2nd Language: 50 points 
Proficient 2nd Language: 40 points 
Competent 2nd Language: 30 points 
Employability Employment 
Experience 
150 15% > 8 years: 150 points 
5-8 years: 100 points 
3-5 years: 50 points 




50 5% Currently employed in a skilled occupation by 
U.S.-based employer OR > 2 years’ experience
working in a skilled occupation for a U.S.-based 
employer: 50 points 




100 10% Has a spouse/partner or first-degree relative U.S. 










100 10% Will be accompanied by spouse/partner or first-
degree relative when moving to U.S.: 100 points 
Demographic 
Characteristics 
Country of Origin 
Bonus 
50 5% Is a national of a state designated a “developing 
country” by USAID: 50 points. 




The first human capital factor we include is education. 
This factor contains two potential sources of points. The 
first is based on an applicant’s formal educational 
attainment, with applicants being granted 100, 150, or 200 
points according the highest post-secondary degree they 
attained. These points allocations are not additive, but 
rather given based on the highest post-secondary degree 
awarded. An applicant who has received both a bachelor’s
degree and a master’s degree, for example, would receive
150 points. 1 
This factor is the most heavily weighted in our points 
rubric because education is both a key predictor of 
employability and a strong indicator of the kinds of 
positive psychological characteristics and pro-social soft 
skills, like adaptability and resilience, that help to foster 
long-term success.2 
The second potential source of points under this factor is a 
small bonus of 50 points for an applicant who holds at 
least one post-secondary degree from a U.S.-based 
institution. We include this for two reasons: First, foreign 
workers who have attended college in the United States 
will likely have an easier time acclimating to the U.S. 
labor market. Second, it is in the interest of the federal 
government, both fiscally and in terms of global soft 
power, to encourage foreign students to attend U.S. 
colleges. 
Age 
The second human capital factor we include is age. 
Candidates can be allocated up to 100 points for this 
factor. Candidates who are between 18 and 29 years old 
when they begin the application process will be allocated 
the full 100 points. For each additional year of age 
beyond 29, a candidate will receive 5 fewer points. For 
example, a 30-year-old candidate will receive 95 points, a 
31-year-old candidate will receive 90, and so on. Per this 
declining pattern, candidates aged 45 years or older will 
receive 0 points for this factor. Children under 18 receive 
no points. 
We have allocated age a significant number of points in 
our proposed points rubric for several reasons. Research 
suggests that immigrants’ age at time of admission is a 
significant predictive factor in the likelihood and degree 
to which they will successfully integrate into the social 
and economic fabric of their new home state.3 The 
allocation of points in this factor is arranged as a simple 
linear decline by age cohort because arriving in a host 
country at a younger age brings various benefits. The 
younger an individual is at the time of their arrival, the 
more flexible they tend to be in adapting to new economic 
and cultural surroundings.4 Younger immigrants will also, 
on average, have greater positive fiscal effects because 
they have more working years ahead of them in which to 
pay taxes and more years until they draw on any public 
retirement funds. And for foreign workers whose native 
language is not English, flexibility and having a longer 
time horizon have some impact on language acquisition. 
Research suggests that immigration at an older age is 
associated with lower fluency in English, while English 
proficiency tends to improve the longer a foreign worker 






While these positive correlations justify favoring younger 
applicants, we opted to allocate the maximum number of 
points to a wide age range—between 18 and 29—and thus 
to set the threshold for declining points at 30. We have a 
few reasons for extending this favored age window over a 
decade into adulthood. Given that our proposed points 
program is aimed at highly skilled foreign workers, our 
points distribution for this factor should account for the 
time that it takes to earn one or more post-secondary 
degrees and/or accumulate skilled work experience. 
Further, even in their late 20s, the average candidate’s
cognitive and social flexibility will have yet to decline 
significantly, and they will still have three or more 
decades of professional life ahead of them. 
Language Proficiency 
The third human capital factor we include is linguistic 
proficiency. This factor contains two potential sources of 
points. We allocate 100 points according to an applicant’s
degree of fluency in English and an additional 50 points 
according to their demonstrated proficiency in a language 
other than English. 
Proficiency in English 
We include a measure of English language proficiency 
among our points categories not out of a belief in the 
inherent importance of English or a nationalist pride in 
the language, but rather because fluency in a host 
country’s majority language has been found to be an 
important predictor of both short-term economic success 
and long-term social integration. Also, the United States 
is heavily reliant on English for many functions and those 
who are not proficient in English may have a harder time 
adapting. In the short term, foreign workers’ fluency in 
the prevailing language of their host state strongly 
influences their likely economic outcomes, not least of 
which is their ability to find and maintain skilled 
employment.6 In addition to influencing the likelihood of 
workforce participation, linguistic fluency has also been 
shown to be strongly related to the pay foreign workers 
can command in the job market. Recent studies have 
found that foreign workers who are highly fluent in their 
host country’s majority language may receive up to 20%
or, in some cases, up to 35%, higher salaries than their 
less-fluent counterparts. 7 In the longer term, fluency in the 
prevailing host state language is vital to foreign workers’
economic and societal integration, improving and 
increasing job opportunities and facilitating social and 
political participation.8 
While awarding points on the basis of English fluency has 
been controversial in past points program proposals in the 
United States, we believe it is still a worthwhile selection 
criteria because of its robust positive value. Whether this 
correlation is due to linguistic or cultural biases of host-
country employers or to less nefarious causes, it is real 
and measurable. 
That said, we acknowledge the structural biases that 
rewarding English proficiency brings with it, and the 
limitations of any measure of linguistic fluency. 9 And 
while it would be impossible to perfectly counterbalance 
those biases and limitations, we aim to reduce their effects 
in two ways: by (1) offering multiple ways of proving 
English fluency and (2) granting points for the degree of 
fluency in an applicant’s native language. 
Proficiency in a language other than English 
In addition to earning points for their degree of fluency in 
English, applicants may also earn points for their degree 
of fluency in one other language, including their own. 
While allocating points based on fluency in a language 
other than English may seem counterintuitive, it is not 
unprecedented among countries with points-tested 
immigration streams.10 Rewarding applicants’ fluency in 
languages other than English will help to foster the 
creation of a culturally and linguistically diverse work 
force, an outcome that is vital to a variety of compelling 
U.S. interests. 
In the economic sphere, the capacity of the United States 
to maintain its economic standing depends on the ability 
of U.S. firms to compete in a globalized market. The 
ability to fluently communicate with potential trade 
partners or colleagues abroad in their native tongues, 
while also being intimately familiar with cultural 
differences or pitfalls, is a vital form of human capital that 
could significantly influence the success or failure of a 
given worker’s firm. Within firms and working teams, 
cultural diversity may generate new ideas or new 
perspectives on existing problems, as people from 
different backgrounds may see solutions, problems, or 
connections that those from other backgrounds may not.11 
And having team members fluent in a variety of 




and messaging that will be clearly understood by foreign 
audiences and avoid embarrassing “brand blunders”
caused by translation mistakes or unintended meanings.12 
Indeed, it has now become common practice among 
transnational companies to conduct “cultural-linguistic 
checks” on any new brands or marketing before they are 
released in a new market. These checks are expensive, 
requiring surveys of native speakers or consultations with 
specialized professional linguists—or hiring PR firms to 
perform these tasks. Having the ability to hire employees 
and team members with personal experience and language 
skill gained from living and working in a target market 
can allow companies to defray some of this cost by 
bringing this cross-cultural expertise in-house. This added 
value of linguistic and cultural fluency can be seen in 
studies of both U.S. and European job markets, with 
workers who have mastery of a foreign language earning 
up to three percent more than their monolingual 
counterparts.13 
In the political and strategic arenas, fostering linguistic 
and cultural diversity among U.S. residents is similarly 
vital for U.S. national security and its capacity to project 
hard and soft power abroad. Recognizing this strategic 
need, the Defense Department has emphasized expertise 
in critical languages in its recruiting programs. Despite 
this, the U.S. military and intelligence services have 
struggled to find sufficient numbers of U.S. nationals with 
expertise in these languages. 14 To address this, the 
Defense Department has invested heavily in language 
training facilities for U.S. servicemembers. 15 Moreover, in 
2008, Congress established the Military Accessions Vital 
to the National Interest (MAVNI)—a program designed 
to allow noncitizens with specialized language skills to 
enlist in the U.S. military. 16 While these investments and 
programmatic changes have improved the language skills 
shortfall, there is still unmet demand for additional native 
or fluent speakers of various mission-critical languages. 
Finally, it makes sense to reward candidates’ fluency in 
their own native language because having high levels of 
fluency in one language may predict a broader capacity 
for language acquisition, thereby acting as an indicator of 
likely English proficiency in the future.17 
Measuring fluency in English 
While various tests exist to test English fluency, the most 
appropriate one—given both the goals of our proposed 
program and the likely demographics of the candidates 
that would pass through it—is the Test of English for 
International Communication (TOEIC). This assessment 
consists of two separate exams: the TOEIC Speaking and 
Writing Test and the TOEIC Listening and Reading Test. 
This assessment is both comprehensive enough and 
specific enough to provide a reliable indication of how 
well a candidate will be able to understand and 
communicate in English on the job. In examining all four 
dimensions of language fluency (reading, listening, 
writing, and speaking), it provides a multi-faceted 
assessment of English ability and fine-grained feedback 
for the candidate regarding specific skills they could 
improve. And the assessment materials themselves are 
tailored to the work environment, requiring subjects to 
perform common workplace tasks, including taking part 
in a conversation about sales and reading English-
language manuals and technical materials. 
The TOEIC is also established and reliable. Over 14,000 
organizations across 160 countries currently use the 
TOEIC to assess current employees’ English fluency, to 
assess potential new employees, and to track the progress 
of employees in English-language usage.18 
Measuring fluency in languages other than English 
Widely accepted exams of language proficiency already 
exist for many of the most commonly spoken languages 
in the world. For example, the American Council on the 
Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL) has established 
versions of their Assessment of Performance toward 
Proficiency in Languages (AAPPL) exam—a fluency test 
that measures reading, writing, listening, and speaking 
skills—that can measure fluency in Arabic, Chinese, 
French, German, Korean, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, 
Hindi, Italian, Japanese, and Thai.19 Like the TOEIC, the 
AAPPL exam assesses all four dimensions of language 
fluency.20 
The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center 
(DLIFLC) has developed tests for some less-commonly 
spoken languages.21 The rating scales and scoring 
methods of any of these exams could be standardized 
using any of a number of existing scales designed to 
compare fluency evaluations across languages, including 
the Interagency Language Roundtable proficiency scale,22 
the Common European Framework of Reference for 









these would be promising standards by which to 
standardize and compare knowledge of a second or third 
language for immigration purposes. 
Alternative methods of establishing fluency 
Whatever metric or evidence of fluency ends up being 
adopted, the task of proving one’s fluency—in English or 
any other language—should not be made overly 
burdensome for either applicants or the immigration 
officials tasked with evaluating them. To this end, we 
propose that applicants seeking to prove their fluency in 
English or a second language should be allowed to do so 
either by taking a standardized language proficiency test 
or by presenting evidence that they have completed at 
least a three-year college degree in which the language 
being asserted was the principal language of instruction. 
Employability 
The fourth human capital factor we include is 
employability. This factor contains two potential sources 
of points. The first is based on the number of years of 
experience in a skilled occupation. For purposes of this 
program, we define “skilled occupation” as used in the 
current H-1B visa program, meaning an occupation 
requiring at least a four-year degree or its equivalent. 
Applicants with more than eight years of experience in a 
skilled occupation will receive the maximum 150 points 
allocated to this factor. Applicants with between five and 
eight years’ experience will receive 100 points, those with 
between three and five years’ experience will receive 50 
points, and candidates with fewer than three years’
experience in a skilled occupation will receive 0 points 
for this factor. 
This factor is the second most heavily weighted factor in 
our points rubric, for two reasons: First, experienced 
workers generally make a more immediate contribution to 
their employer and to the broader economy than do less 
experienced workers. And experienced workers bring 
with them more intellectual capital, in the form of best 
practices and professional networks, than do less 
experienced workers. Second, building up years of 
sustained employment in a skilled profession requires at 
least some degree of the same psychological 
characteristics and social soft skills as those required to 
complete a post-secondary education. 
The second potential source of points under this factor is a 
bonus of 50 points for applicants who are currently 
employed by a U.S.-based employer in a skilled 
occupation or who have had at least two years’ experience
working for a U.S.-based employer in a skilled 
occupation. The term “skilled occupation” employed in 
the criteria for this small points category will also be 
defined as an occupation requiring a four-year degree or 
equivalent. 
We include this bonus for two reasons. First, by deciding 
to employ a prospective foreign worker, a U.S.-based 
employer implicitly endorses that candidate’s credentials
and the value of their human capital. Second, candidates 
with current employment in the United States or with an 
offer of employment upon their arrival have already 
surpassed one of the major hurdles in economic and social 
integration. 
Family Support 
The fifth human capital factor we include is family 
support. This factor contains two potential sources of 
points. Candidates who have a spouse or an adult first-
degree relative who is already residing in the United 
States as a citizen or lawful permanent resident will be 
granted 100 points. (The term “first-degree relative”
denotes an individual’s parent, sibling, or adult child.) 
Candidates who, if selected for admission, will be 
accompanied by a spouse or one or more first-degree 
relatives will be granted 100 points. These two 
subcategories are additive, meaning that candidates who 
satisfy both of these stated criteria will receive 200 points. 
We include these two measures of direct family support in 
our points rubric because having a personal support 
network is a key predictor of an individual’s long-term 
economic integration and personal well-being, and 
because family units are culturally important in the United 
States. While personal support networks are not limited to 
family members, candidates who will have a spouse or 
close family member with them in the United States will 
arrive with the foundations of a support network already 
in place. Having a partner or close relative nearby can act 
as a bulwark against social isolation and can provide a 
source of much-needed psychological, emotional, and 
practical support. The presence of a partner or close 
family member should be seen as a form of human capital 






worker’s capacity to weather both the challenges and 
setbacks that accompany moving to the United States and 
adapting to a new social and work environment, and the 
longer-term aspects of human life that we all face. 25 
In addition to the ways in which including family 
supports as a factor in our points rubric might lead to 
better integration outcomes for the foreign workers 
selected under this program, including these kinds of 
family-friendly considerations in the program’s selection 
criteria may make the United States a more attractive 
destination for skilled foreign workers choosing between 
potential destination states. In the words of researchers 
Harriet Duleep and Mark Regets, “highly educated 
immigrants have families too.”26 As such, in designing 
skilled immigration policies, we should remember that in 
deciding where to bring their talents and earning capacity, 
skilled foreign workers report weighing family concerns 
just as much as, if not more heavily than, factors like 
salary or professional advancement.27 
Adopting policies that incentivize skilled foreign workers 
to bring their families with them when coming to the 
United States will also result in longer-term benefits. 
Broadly speaking, the children of parents with high levels 
of human capital tend to attain high levels of human 
capital themselves.28 This tendency is well-documented 
and has been attributed to a number of different potential 
causal factors. Leaving aside the thorny issue of genetic 
or inherited capacity, much of the correlation between 
high levels of education in parents and higher rates of 
education in children can be attributed to socioeconomic 
and cultural factors. Highly educated parents may have 
more financial resources to devote to their children’s
education. And even in the absence of this financial 
advantage, these parents can pass on non-monetary 
intellectual capital—the cultural and practical 
understanding of academic culture—that will help their 
children navigate educational institutions.29 
Demographic Characteristics 
The sixth and final factor we include is intended to offset 
some of the structural advantages falling to certain types 
of candidates that plague any purportedly meritocratic 
selection system. Under this factor, a small number of 
points will be allocated according to a candidate’s country 
of origin and gender. In the former subcategory, nationals 
of a state currently on the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID)’s list of “developing countries”30 
will be granted 50 points. In the latter subcategory, female 
candidates will be granted 50 points. These two 
subcategories are additive, meaning that candidates who 
satisfy both criteria will receive 100 points. 
We include these demographic factors because although 
contemporary points-based immigration systems that 
select candidates based on training and skills are more 
transparent and unbiased than prior systems, they are still 
prone to some degree of inequality and imbalance. 
Indeed, even when systems are facially neutral regarding 
the gender, race, or national origin of applicants, these 
systems can still lead to significantly disparate outcomes 
for women or those from lower-income nations. Women 
remain significantly underrepresented in both the 
applicant pools and admitted cohorts in highly skilled visa 
programs in countries throughout the OECD.31 And these 
same systems are consistently more likely to admit 
individuals from richer countries than from poorer ones.32 
Some degree of this disparity has been linked to specific 
design elements common to many skilled immigration 
programs, such as the use of a “shortage occupation list”33 
or defining “skilled employment experience” according to 
salary earned.34 For these and other reasons, when 
designing our points program, we have opted not to 
include these policy elements. 
That said, however, we acknowledge that our points 
program cannot fully avoid these problems of structural 
advantage and disparate outcomes. Any program that 
selects candidates based on human capital will contain 
structural biases, because not every potential applicant has 
equal access to the opportunities, resources, and 
institutions necessary to accumulate human capital. In 
many countries around the world, women do not have 
equal access to education or skilled employment, whether 
due to formal exclusion or cultural gender-based 
expectations.35 Similarly, because of marked differences 
in educational institutions and size of skilled economic 
sectors across states, applicants from developing countries 
may face significant obstacles to gaining a degree from a 
globally recognized institution or finding skilled 
employment opportunities in their home countries.36 In 
addition to these problems of unequal access, many 
scholars have argued that the inclusion of seemingly 
neutral factors like a candidate’s age37 or even the focus 
on “skilled” immigration itself may have the effect of
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 creating “winners and losers along these lines of a relatively small pilot program, so there is no need to 
identity.”38 spread the administrative or logistical burden across 
It is important to address and counteract these kinds of 
structural issues to the extent possible, partly for reasons 
of fairness and partly to be consistent with the United 
States’ longstanding commitment to non-discrimination in 
both its domestic law and international agreements. 
Beyond these normative justifications, there are also 
strategic and utilitarian reasons to address disparities tied 
to gender and national origin. As discussed in the section 
above addressing the points allocated on the basis of 
language proficiency, there is significant economic and 
competitive value to fostering diversity in the workforce, 
at both the company and national levels. Thus, any skills-
based visa selection program that disproportionately 
selects affluent males from developed countries would 
hurt U.S.-based firms, the U.S. economy, and the United 
States as a global leader in innovation and trade. 
For all these reasons, we include in our proposal two 
points bonuses that are meant to at least partially 
counteract the structural disadvantages that women and 
nationals of developing countries often face when 
attempting to build their human capital. This policy 
design tool—bonuses based on demographics—is 
admittedly a blunt solution to a set of nuanced problems. 
But it is a step in the right direction. 
Procedural Elements 
Administrative and Oversight Authority/Jurisdiction 
If the pilot program and related proposals presented in 
this report gain sufficient political support among U.S. 
lawmakers, that process would have to begin in Congress. 
We recommend that this implementing legislation be 
introduced and passed through Congress as a standalone 
bill, rather than as part of a comprehensive immigration 
reform package. We discuss this strategy in more detail 
later in this chapter. 
Once enacted, the responsibility to implement and operate 
the pilot program would pass to the executive branch. 
Although authority over various aspects of U.S. 
immigration is currently divided among several executive 
agencies, we recommend granting operational authority 
over the pilot program to a single administrative agency. 
We make this recommendation on the grounds that this is 
agencies. Additionally, dividing administrative authority 
over this program among agencies would introduce 
unnecessary overlap, barriers, and transaction costs that 
would make the program less efficient and flexible. We 
believe that the agency most suited to manage the pilot 
program currently is U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS). 
Regardless of which agency is granted responsibility over 
this program, that agency will need to work with other 
agencies that oversee related government issues. If 
Congress selects USCIS to operate the pilot program, for 
example, it would still need to liaise with other 
government agencies, such as the Department of Labor. 
Specifically, the Department of Labor should be granted 
the authority to compile lists of occupations to be 
classified as “highly skilled” for the purposes of the pilot 
program, to compile lists of occupations and job 
categories in which there are existing labor shortages, and 
to design the methodology employed in both of these 
tasks. 
This cooperation and consultation would also have to 
extend to Congress. While implementation and 
operational responsibilities would be delegated to USCIS, 
that agency should not be granted unfettered authority to 
make changes to the pilot program. While the details of 
this division of authority would be worked out in the 
legislative drafting process, it could look something like 
the following. In addition to responsibilities related to 
regular operation of the pilot program, Congress might 
grant USCIS officials a degree of leeway in making small 
operational changes (e.g., adjusting points thresholds for 
each monthly draw according to trends in the candidate 
pool, setting and adjusting tiebreaker rules, adjusting 
points table category allocations by 10-15%). If USCIS 
wants to make any changes that would exceed this limited 
operational discretion, USCIS officials may propose those 
changes and they would need to be approved by an 
appropriate legislative gatekeeping body. We propose 
limiting this legislative review to the chairs and ranking 
members of immigration subcommittees, a majority of the 
members of the Senate and House immigration 
subcommittees, or some similar set immigration 









Granting the administrative agency overseeing the pilot 
program a limited degree of authority to make changes 
may be seen as going against the prevailing wisdom in the 
policy literature. Others argue that for a points program to 
succeed, it must be “actively managed” by policymakers
capable of adjusting the parameters of their points 
programs (the “attributes and points awarded”) when 
necessary to account for “changing economic and labor-
market policy priorities” and to respond to problems or 
inconsistencies revealed by ongoing policy evaluations 
(such as “longitudinal data on selected immigrants’
economic outcomes”).39 We agree that the pilot program 
should be actively managed, and that it must be flexible 
enough to allow for adjustment over time. However, 
unlike the Canadian and Australian points systems on 
which these experts base this recommendation, the pilot 
program laid out in this report is designed to focus on 
selecting individuals who will help to build the United 
States’ long-term human capital infrastructure, not on 
short-term labor market needs. Thus, given that there is 
no need for the officials tasked with operating the pilot 
program to adapt to a fast-changing labor market, we 
believe our pilot program can be successfully managed 
and adjusted over time, as needed, by administrative 
officials without requiring the wholesale discretion 
granted to immigration officials in the Australian and 
Canadian systems. 
Under our recommended division of authority outlined 
above, this program would be sufficiently flexible to 
allow administrative officials to address minor issues of 
adjustment that might arise during implementation or the 
normal operation of this program without legislative 
consultation. This discretion would ensure that necessary 
adjustments can be made to keep this program 
operational. On the other hand, although limiting the 
authority of administrators to make significant changes 
may reduce the program’s flexibility, such limitations 
foster another quality commonly associated with points 
programs: transparency. By limiting the ease with which 
major changes can be made to the structure of our pilot 
program, our proposed division of authority encourages 
stability in program requirements over time. This stability 
would help to ensure that prospective immigrants, 
employers, and any other actors involved in the 
application process understand and can rely on the 
program’s rules, making the program more attractive to 
high-quality applicants and more able to produce timely 
and predictable results. 
Data Collection and Evaluation 
Our pilot program is designed to establish an immigration 
stream dedicated to selecting individuals who have the 
capacity to contribute to the long-term economic growth 
and overall societal health of the United States. Although 
we believe that our proposed program will succeed in this 
goal, all forecasts are fallible and the program’s
parameters and procedures will need to be adjusted and 
fine-tuned. To make these kinds of changes, 
administrators and oversight bodies must have access to 
detailed and reliable information about the employment, 
economic, and societal outcomes of foreign workers 
admitted through this program. 
To this end, we propose that the administrative agency 
overseeing the pilot program be required to gather data on 
the economic and social outcomes of candidates selected 
through the program. Data points that would need to be 
gathered include: 
• High-level data about the operation of the pilot 
program, such as the number of candidates selected for 
entry through the pilot program each year, the 
parameters for each periodic draw from the candidate 
pool, the number of invitations to apply issued versus 
the number of applications actually submitted, and the 
rate of acceptance among applicants. 
• Demographic data on candidates’ birthplace/nativity, 
age, educational qualifications, proposed occupations, 
and time spent in the United States before application 
or admission. These data points should be gathered and 
retained for all candidates who submit an expression of 
interest and are placed in the EOI pool. These data 
should allow for comparisons between the makeup of 
the overall EOI pool and the subsets of candidates 
invited to apply and those ultimately admitted. 
• Outcome data on admitted foreign workers, including 
their workforce participation, what occupation they 
came to work in after admission to the United States, 
their geographic destinations, and the degree to which 
their actual employment matches their educational 






• Outcome data on various non-economic dimensions of 
integration, including social, civic and cultural 
aspects. 40 
The administrative agency tasked with implementing our 
pilot program could gather most of these operational and 
demographic data points by retaining and organizing 
internal administrative data generated by the EOI 
application management system. To generate reliable data 
on outcomes, however, the agency would need to conduct 
staged surveys of foreign workers admitted through this 
program. 
These surveys could be modeled on the Continuous 
Survey of Australia's Migrants (CSAM) or Canada’s
Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC). 
These large-scale, longitudinal surveys, described in the 
case study chapters above, ask questions about 
employment and integration of a sample of each incoming 
foreign worker cohort. Both surveys employ a staged 
survey strategy that involves issuing surveys to a selected 
sample in waves, with respondents being issued surveys 
at—for example—6 months, 18 months, and 42 months 
after arrival. 
To ensure that the data gathered by the agency running 
our pilot program are useful in assessing and reassessing 
the elements of the program, we recommend that the 
survey and administrative data be linked and stored to 
allow researchers to disaggregate individuals according to 
demographic characteristics and conduct fine-grained 
comparisons of outcomes across different subgroups. 
Additionally, if possible, these data should link to data 
drawn from Census Bureau–administered surveys, 
including the decennial census and the American 
Community Survey.41 
This dataset would be available, of course, to internal 
researchers working for the overseeing administrative 
agency. But the data should, as much as possible, also be 
made available to outside evaluators (e.g., external 
agencies, firms, or academics) and the public. 
Because this dataset would involve record linkage, 
participants in the EOI pool and respondents to any 
subsequent surveys would need to give their consent to be 
included in the dataset. To protect the privacy of those 
candidates and admitted foreign workers whose 
information is included, the individual-level data should 
be de-identified and anonymized as much as possible. To 
reduce the risk that individual records could be “re-
identified,” the data storage protocols could employ 
privacy protection techniques such as deleting personally 
identifiable information, masked data-sharing (employing 
techniques such as list inflation, third-party linkage, or 
grouped linkage), or making fully linked data available 
only through secure data centers where researchers are 
permitted to analyze the data under controlled 
conditions.42 
Standing Advisory Board 
In addition to having access to comprehensive and 
reliable data, administrators and lawmakers charged with 
overseeing our pilot program should also have ready 
access to expert advice on how to interpret the data, what 
policy changes could be made, and the effects that any 
such changes might have. We therefore recommend that 
Congress create a standing advisory board consisting of a 
variety of stakeholders in immigration policy, including 
policy experts in the economics, sociology, and public 
policy effects of immigration; civil servants with 
experience in administering the United States’ and/or
other countries’ immigration systems; and representatives
from professional associations, labor unions, and industry 
trade associations.43 
This advisory commission should be established as an 
independent, non-partisan body to provide objective, 
evidence-based, professional advice and analysis to 
lawmakers and administrators. While the mandate of this 
commission could be limited to matters relating 
specifically to our pilot program, we recommend that the 
commission have a wider purview, allowing them to issue 
recommendations about any policy issues relating to U.S. 
immigration as a whole. This advisory board should be 
empowered to address issues or questions raised by 
lawmakers or administrators, and to issue advisory reports 
sua sponte. 
Establishing this independent source of advice and 
analysis would provide at least two significant benefits: 
First, it would establish a uniform channel through which 
lawmakers and administrators, regardless of their political 
alignment, could seek advice that might help them avoid 
making policy changes that would have unintended and 
undesirable downstream effects. Second, being able to 





independent panel may provide some degree of political 
separation for lawmakers and administrators, allowing 
policy reviews or adjustments to be cast more as 
technocratic exercises than as sites of partisan conflict. 
While the United States currently lacks a standing 
commission on immigration, various analogous advisory 
bodies exist elsewhere in the federal government. For 
example, when debating monetary or trade policy, 
Congress and the executive branch rely—both for 
technical and political reasons—on research and 
recommendations made by the Federal Reserve Board and 
the International Trade Commission. And there exists 
significant support, among both current members of 
Congress44 and advocates and experts in the broader 
immigration policy landscape, 45 for the creation of a 
similarly nonpartisan advisory commission to support 
policymaking in the area of immigration. 
Periodic Review Process 
To ensure that lawmakers and administrators charged 
with overseeing the pilot program have access to data and 
advice and put these resources to use, the legislation 
implementing this program should include requirements 
and procedural guidelines for periodic reviews of this 
program’s effectiveness and efficiency. These periodic
reviews would require the administrative agency running 
the pilot program to prepare and submit a report for 
Congressional oversight every two years. These reports 
would provide an overall assessment of the functioning of 
the program based on compilations and analyses of 
available administrative and survey data, as well as 
proposals for any revisions or adjustments that 
administration officials believe are required to improve 
the operation or outcomes of the program. 
Building in a requirement for regular reviews, as well as 
specific standards and guidelines that should be 
employed, has a number of advantages. Among other 
things, it would act as a structural reminder of the 
provisional and experimental nature of the pilot program. 
By requiring lawmakers and administrators to regularly 
ask questions about the effectiveness of this program and 
to think about ways In which the program’s elements
could be adjusted or corrected, this built-in review 
process makes it more likely that this program will in fact 
be improved over time through a process of iterative 
reform. 
§ 4 EXPLANATIONS OF DESIGN CHOICES 
Why Implement Our Program as a Pilot and Not a 
Permanent New Visa Track? 
Reworking the entire economic stream of the U.S. 
immigration system from one that is entirely employer-
driven to one that is government- and supply-driven 
would be a massive undertaking and would require a great 
deal of political capital and agreement. By contrast, 
creating a relatively small pilot program would require 
much less effort and political capital. 
Furthermore, although this kind of selection system has 
been well-tested elsewhere in countries that share many 
characteristics with the United States, this does not mean 
that this system can be “imported” wholesale or that it
will have the same outcomes and effects that it has in our 
case study nations. Thus, testing out this kind of selection 
system through a small pilot program would generate 
valuable data regarding outcomes and effects in the U.S. 
context and allow U.S. policy makers who support scaling 
up this kind of program to fine-tune and address 
"teething" issues before a larger-scale roll-out. 
Why a Single Application Stream? 
The points-based selection systems established in Canada 
and Australia are used to manage multiple visa programs 
or visa subcategories. We believe that the points-based 
program we propose in this report could be adapted 
relatively easily to accommodate multiple visa streams 
should lawmakers decide to do so. 
For the purposes of this proposal, though, we opted to 
keep our focus narrow, laying out a program aimed only 
at high-skilled foreign workers. In the interest of 
simplicity and clarity, we refrained from being too 
expansive in the goals addressed or fine-grained in the 
distinctions made. 
If this program proves successful enough that lawmakers 
would like to expand it, the next step we recommend 
would be the addition of a stream aimed at medium-





Why Allocate Permanent Visas Rather Than 
Temporary/Provisional Visas? 
Among countries that employ points-based immigrant 
selection systems and have updated their skilled 
immigration policies in recent years, there has been a 
trend toward an increased use of temporary or provisional 
visas. This trend represents a departure from the norm. 
Traditionally, points programs have been employed to 
allocate permanent employment visas. The evidence from 
these earlier points programs suggest that, in the long 
term, individuals with the kinds of human capital 
characteristics we will be selecting for tend to exhibit 
high levels of employment, attain high salaries over their 
career, and thus tend to contribute to their host countries’
labor markets and tax revenues. Given the depth of this 
evidence, and our resultant confidence that the kinds of 
highly educated, well-qualified individuals our program 
will select for will contribute to the economic and societal 
good of the United States, there is no particular need to 
place administrative hurdles in front of them. 
We opted to follow this older pattern and design our pilot 
program around a set of 50,000 permanent visas for a 
number of reasons. First, because our program focuses on 
selecting individuals who can contribute to the long-term 
success of the United States, employing temporary or 
provisional visas would make little sense. Second, we 
believe there is no compelling reason to impose the 
additional cost and uncertainty that come with provisional 
or two-step visa programs on the high-skilled foreign 
workers selected under our program. By contrast, by 
sparing these foreign workers this unnecessary 
administrative burden and offering them long-term 
stability, we free their time and attention and allow them 
to get on with making their contributions to the United 
States and embedding themselves in our society. Third, 
from the perspective of the global race for talent, the offer 
of permanent residence in the United States without 
needing to attain any provisional or temporary visa 
beforehand would be a significant “pull factor” that would 
make the United States that much more attractive 
compared to our global competition.46 
Why 50,000 Green Cards? 
In deciding on the scale of our proposed points program, 
we recommend 50,000 green cards annually largely 
because this would make our pilot program roughly the 
same size as the current diversity visa lottery. By adopting 
this scale, patterning the size of our program on an 
already existing small visa program, we aim to make our 
proposed program large enough to be a reliable proof of 
concept but also small enough to be politically feasible. 
Why Employ a Points-Based Selection Mechanism? 
Points-based selection mechanisms have long been lauded 
by immigration policy experts for their effectiveness and 
efficiency. Additionally, these systems have a series of 
procedural advantages, “streamlining the immigration 
process and yielding transparent, objective, and flexible 
criteria for selecting skilled immigrants.”47 
Why Adopt an “Expression of Interest” Application
System? 
As explained above, we recommend that our pilot 
program be managed using a two-step expression of 
interest (EOI) system like those used in Canada and 
Australia. We have a number of reasons for making this 
recommendation. Two-step EOI systems process 
applications more efficiently and quickly, reduce 
administrative burdens on immigration officials and 
applicants, and reduce the likelihood of application 
processing backlogs. 
After adopting their EOI systems, the average processing 
times for immigration applicants in both Canada and 
Australia dropped markedly. Currently, successful 
immigration candidates can expect to have their 
applications processed in less than six months. That 
marks a significant improvement over the years-long 
processing times such applicants had to endure under both 
countries’ previous systems.48 Administrators for these 
programs have been able to achieve these processing 
times partly by adjusting the size and frequency of draws, 
calibrating the volume of applications to be examined to 
match the current processing capacity of immigration 
officers. 
Administrative burdens are further lowered under EOI 
systems as compared to older one-step application 
systems because any EOI profiles that have not been 
selected before the set profile expiration date are 
automatically deleted. This automatic clearing function 
serves to relieve immigration officers of the 





with processing applications from candidates that would 
ultimately be rejected as underqualified. 
In considering whether to adopt an EOI system or the 
older one-step selection system, U.S. policymakers should 
treat Canada’s and Australia’s decision to adopt EOI 
systems, and to maintain them in the years since, as 
significant evidence in favor of selecting such a system. 
In both countries, transitioning to an EOI system from the 
older one-step selection systems involved revamping or 
retrofitting existing systems, and so entailed massive 
economic, political, and logistical costs associated with 
designing and implementing a new application system; 
retraining immigration personnel; and widespread 
litigation from current applicants. The fact that both states 
opted to bear these costs and go ahead with the transition 
to an EOI system suggests that they believed that the 
efficiency, flexibility, and cost benefits of this newer 
approach were worth it. Given that the United States does 
not have an existing points system that would need to be 
revamped or adapted, it could reap the “benefits of
backwardness”49—benefitting from the costly experiences 
of its peer countries without incurring any of the 
innovation or retrofitting costs that those countries had to 
pay. 
§ 5 EXPLANATION OF 
POLITICAL/STRATEGIC CHOICES 
Why Advocate for a Standalone Bill? 
We recommend that Congress implement our pilot 
program in a standalone piece of legislation for several 
reasons: 
First, we believe that in the current atmosphere of 
political polarization and legislative gridlock, 
comprehensive immigration reform seems less likely than 
ever.50 The rocky reception to the 2019 RAISE Act bill 
indicates that the parties are even further from a 
negotiated compromise than they were in 2013, when the 
Senate passed a comprehensive immigration reform bill51 
that died in the House.52 
Second, although this fractious political atmosphere may 
make it effectively impossible to build a broad enough 
coalition of support to pass a comprehensive immigration 
package, we believe that it may be possible to cobble 
together sufficient support to pass certain narrow reforms 
that address issues in a way that can be supported by 
groups and ideological positions across the political 
spectrum. This is also an issue on which the American 
public broadly agrees. Roughly eight in ten U.S. adults 
surveyed in a January 2019 Pew Research Center poll 
supported policies that “encourag[e] highly skilled people
to immigrate and work in the U.S.”53 This support is 
consistent with results from other polls conducted over 
the last decade showing substantial public approval for 
increasing high-skilled immigration to the United States.54 
Third, we believe that getting something done is better 
than getting nothing done. Furthermore, we believe that 
the act of passing any immigration reforms, however 
narrow or incremental, might help to break the legislative 
logjam and lay the political and strategic foundations for 
further improvement. 
Fourth, we believe that enacting reforms that specifically 
address skilled immigration could be a particularly useful 
first step in the process of overall immigration reform. 
Based on survey evidence collected in Canada and the 
United States, we believe that an increase in high-skilled 
immigration could help to change the perception among 
U.S. citizens toward immigration generally. Repeated 
surveys of the Canadian and Australian electorate’s views
on immigration show higher levels of support for 
immigration, and that this positive evaluation of 
immigration is due in large part to the large proportion of 
immigration to those countries that is dedicated to high-
skilled employment-based immigration. Based on this 
evidence, we believe that enacting a standalone piece of 
legislation that not only admits 50,000 additional skilled, 
trained and educated foreign workers into the United 
States but does so using a transparent and open selection 
process would be a useful step toward changing domestic 
attitudes about immigration. 
1 For a discussion of some of these challenges and the likely Discussion Papers (Bonn, Germany: IZA—Institute of Labor 
effects they will have on the U.S. economy, see Harry J. Holzer, Economics, January 2020). 








3 The United States has two current visa programs, EB-1A and 
O-1, in which candidates are selected on the basis of their 
extraordinary skills or abilities and which are not aimed at (and 
do not require proof of) filling a gap in the U.S. labor market. 
But these visa programs are numerically quite small and are not 
explicitly aimed at building human capital. 
1 Candidates who have received a degree from an institution 
from outside the United States would need to have this degree 
verified by a third-party credential evaluation service, such as 
those that make up the membership of the National Association 
of Credential Evaluation Services. Candidates should be given 
some degree of guidance and, if necessary, financial support in 
this credential verification process because research into 
immigration outcomes suggests that effective recognition of 
foreign credentials is vital for preventing the problem of skills 
mismatching and brain waste. This research suggests that 
policies that facilitate candidates’ efforts to have their foreign 
credentials properly recognized may improve wages, job 
satisfaction, and labor market integration. See Marco Pecoraro 
and Philippe Wanner, “Does the Recognition of Foreign 
Credentials Decrease the Risk for Immigrants of Being 
Mismatched in Education or Skills?,” in Migrants and Expats: 
The Swiss Migration and Mobility Nexus, ed. Ilka Steiner and 
Philippe Wanner (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 
2019), 161–86, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05671-1_7. 
2 For example, a 2013 study found that students’ adaptability,
resilience, and other dimensions of their capacity to respond to 
uncertainty and novel circumstances were strong predictors of 
their academic and non-academic success. See Andrew J. Martin 
et al., “Adaptability: How Students’ Responses to Uncertainty 
and Novelty Predict Their Academic and Non-Academic 
Outcomes.,” Journal of Educational Psychology 105, no. 3 
(August 2013): 728–46, https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032794. 
Given these findings that students with higher levels of 
adaptability, resilience, and other psychological characteristics 
tend to have higher levels of academic success, it is reasonable 
to suppose that many if not most individuals with higher levels 
of academic success—e.g., by completing a tertiary or graduate 
degree—would likely score highly on psychological measures of 
adaptability and resilience. Of course we cannot reverse this 
causal arrow with complete certainty, but we believe this 
inductive supposition is at least a reasonable hypothesis. 
Similarly, a number of studies have found that certain forms of 
emotional intelligence are significantly and positively associated 
with respondents’ academic achievement, allowing us to make 
at least a tentative assumption that individuals with high levels 
of academic achievement may have a higher probability of 
exhibiting higher than average levels of emotional intelligence. 
See, e.g., Harsha N. Perera and Michelle DiGiacomo, “The 
Relationship of Trait Emotional Intelligence with Academic 
Performance: A Meta-Analytic Review,” Learning and 
Individual Differences 28 (December 2013): 20–33, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lindif.2013.08.002. (A meta-analysis of 
40 prior published studies on the link between emotional 
intelligence and academic performance, finding robust evidence 
that emotional intelligence is a valid predictor of academic 
performance). Further research may find a similar relationship 
between the positive psychological and attitudinal traits laid out 
above and the attainment of foreign language fluency or years of 
skilled work experience. 
3 See Bjorn Anders Gustafsson, Hanna Mac Innes, and Torun 
Österberg, “Age at Immigration Matters for Labor Market 
Integration—the Swedish Example,” IZA Journal of 
Development and Migration 7, no. 1 (December 2017): 1, 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s40176-017-0087-1. See also Joseph 
Schaafsma and Arthur Sweetman, “Immigrant Earnings: Age at 
Immigration Matters,” Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue 
Canadienne D`Economique 34, no. 4 (November 2001): 1066–
99, https://doi.org/10.1111/0008-4085.00113. 
4 Studies on this tendency have attributed this flexibility to a 
variety of factors, including higher levels of cognitive flexibility, 
less entrenched work or social habits, a greater willingness or 
ability to accept less-desirable jobs, or age-related bias against 
older workers. See, e.g., Gustafsson, Mac Innes, and Österberg, 
“Age at Immigration Matters for Labor Market Integration—the 
Swedish Example.”
5 See Barry R. Chiswick and Paul W. Miller, “Immigration, 
Language and Multiculturalism in Australia,” The Australian 
Economic Review 32, no. 4 (December 1999): 369–85, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8462.00124. See also Barry R. 
Chiswick and Paul W. Miller, “English Language Fluency 
among Immigrants in the United States,” Research in Labor 
Economics 17 (1998): 151–200. 
6 Ana M. Ferrer, Garnett Picot, and William Craig Riddell, 
“New Directions in Immigration Policy: Canada’s Evolving 
Approach to the Selection of Economic Immigrants,” 
International Migration Review 48, no. 3 (September 2014): 
850, https://doi.org/10.1111/imre.12121. (Writing that, among 
skilled immigrants to Canada, those with “good language skills 
in English or French can much more easily convert their 
education to earnings than those with poor skills.”)
7 See Barry R. Chiswick and Paul W. Miller, “International 
Migration and the Economics of Language,” in Handbook of the 
Economics of International Migration, ed. Barry R. Chiswick 
and Paul W. Miller, 2014, 257–63. (Finding that higher levels of 
English fluency among foreign workers in Anglophone 
countries is associated with a wage premium of up to 20%.) See 
also Alícia Adserà and Mariola Pytliková, “Language and
Migration,” in The Palgrave Handbook of Economics and 
Language, ed. Victor Ginsburgh and Shlomo Weber, 2016, 353–
61. (Discussing the results of various analyses of the effects of 
fluency in the host-country language upon foreign workers’ 
earnings, showing increases of between 5 and 35%.) Similar 
wage effects of fluency have been shown in a range of other 
studies. See, e.g., Barry R. Chiswick, “Speaking, Reading, and 
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